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“LOSER PAYS” IN PATENT EXAMINATION 
Neel U. Sukhatme∗ 
ABSTRACT 
Many scholars and practitioners believe there are too many 
“weak” patents—those that should not have issued but somehow 
get approved by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO). To 
the extent they exist, such patents unnecessarily tax real 
innovation and generate welfare losses for society. 
Some commentators have focused on the PTO’s failure to 
exclude weak patents, or the damage caused by these patents in 
litigation, often by patent trolls. But this scholarly discussion 
misses the point. The present Article argues that weak patents 
largely stem from a pricing problem: namely, a patent applicant 
pays higher patent fees when she succeeds (i.e., receives PTO 
approval) than when she fails (i.e., is rejected by the PTO). 
The Article explains why such pricing is precisely 
backwards, penalizing good patent applications instead of bad 
ones. It then proposes a novel remedy: import “loser pays” 
concepts from litigation into patent examination. By forcing 
unsuccessful patent applicants to pay more, a loser-pays system 
disincentivizes weak applications and improves application 
quality. 
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The Article also describes how a loser-pays system could 
lower patent examiners’ burden and discourage continuation 
applications, both of which slow down patent examination. In 
doing so, the Article sketches out a new patent system that is at 
once more efficient and more effective in weeding out weak 
patents. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Many scholars believe the U.S. patent system is not working 
as intended.1 The purpose of this system, which dates back to the 
country’s founding,2 is to incentivize innovation, by giving 
creators of new and useful inventions a period of exclusivity to 
prevent others from free-riding on their discoveries.3 But today’s 
patent system faces a number of vexing challenges. Patents often 
take many years to issue.4 Patent litigation can cost millions, if 
not tens of millions, of dollars.5 The presence of patent thickets—
patches of dense, overlapping patent rights whose boundaries are 
difficult to discern—makes it difficult for businesses to know 
whether they will be sued if they commercialize a new 
innovation.6 And perhaps most saliently, non-practicing entities 
(NPEs, often called “patent assertion entities,” or more 
                                            
 1. See, e.g., DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE 
COURTS CAN SOLVE IT 3–4 (2009); JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT 
FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 11, 54 
(2008); John R. Thomas, Collusion and Collective Action in the Patent System: A Proposal 
for Patent Bounties, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 305, 305 (2001) (“The patent system has reaped a 
dubious harvest from policies of the past decade.”); Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six 
Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property Rights for Business Concepts and Patent 
System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577, 589–91 (1999); Cf. John M. Golden, 
Proliferating Patents and Patent Law’s “Cost Disease,” 51 HOUS. L. REV. 455, 457, 463 
(2013) (arguing that claims of a patent “crisis” might be overstated). 
 2. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 8 (“The Congress shall have Power 
To . . . promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to 
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”); 
see also Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109, 109–12 (Apr. 10, 1790) (repealed 1793) (first 
federal patent act). 
 3. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012) (enabling a patentee to prohibit others from 
making, using, selling, offering for sale, or importing the patented invention in the United 
States). 
 4. The average time from patent application filing to issuance has ranged from two 
to four years. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Kimberly A. Moore, Ending Abuse of Patent 
Continuations, 84 B.U. L. REV. 63, 71 (2004) (finding average pendency of 2.47 years for 
patents issued between 1976 and 2000); see also Dennis Crouch, Patent Pendency Time 
Series and Why Care About Prosecution Delays, PATENTLY-O (Sept. 10, 2012), 
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2012/09/patent-pendency-time-series-and-why-care-
about-prosecution-delays.html [http://perma.cc/7UMA-8QCG ] (median pendency steadily 
increased to a peak of over 3.6 years in 2009, and slightly declined to about 3.25 years in 
2012). 
 5. See Christopher B. Seaman, Reconsidering the Georgia-Pacific Standard for 
Reasonable Royalty Patent Damages, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1661, 1725 (citing Am. Intell. 
Prop. L. Ass’n, Report of the Economic Survey 2009 at I-129 (2009)). For suits where the 
amount at risk was between $1 million and $25 million, average patent litigation costs 
were about $3.1 million. Id. 
 6. See, e.g., Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent 
Pools, and Standard Setting, in 1 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 119, 120–21 
(Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds., 2001) (defining a patent thicket as “a dense web of overlapping 
intellectual property rights that a company must hack its way through in order to 
actually commercialize new technology”). 
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notoriously, “patent trolls”) file lawsuits that hold-up business 
and arguably tax real innovation.7 
Many commentators believe these problems stem from the 
presence of “weak” or “bad” patents. Although definitions vary, 
most commentators agree that weak patents are those that, 
when examined closely, do not meet the statutory requirements 
of patentability but nonetheless somehow received approval by 
the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO).8 
To the extent they exist, weak patents are problematic 
because they serve no socially useful purpose.9 The whole point of 
patents is to incentivize innovation by allowing individuals and 
companies to recoup the fixed costs incurred in inventing and 
commercializing new products and services by giving them a 
limited term monopoly.10 Because weak patents are not 
legitimate “inventions,” there is no reason to grant a legal 
monopoly for these creations. 
Moreover, scholars have documented the myriad costs that 
weak patents can impose on society. These include: costs borne 
by patent examiners who wade through piles of bad patent 
                                            
 7. See generally Robert P. Merges, The Trouble with Trolls: Innovation, 
Rent-Seeking, and Patent Law Reform, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1583, 1586–88 (2009). 
NPEs are technically different from patent assertion entities (PAEs). NPEs do not 
necessarily assert patents against others; they just do not practice the patents they own. 
James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes, 99 CORNELL L. 
REV. 387, 387 (2014). On the other hand, PAEs’ main goal is to assert patents they do not 
practice against alleged infringers. 
 8. See, e.g., Stephen Yelderman, Improving Patent Quality with Applicant 
Incentives, 28 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 77, 78, 82–83 (2014) (“Over the last decade, legal 
scholars from every corner have come forward to decry the unacceptably high number of 
invalid patents issued by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (‘USPTO’) and to suggest 
reforms to reduce it.”); Jonathan S. Masur, Costly Screens and Patent Examination, 2 J. 
LEGAL ANAL. 687, 687 (2010) (“Due in large part to the incentives the PTO places upon its 
own employees, patent office review has acquired a reputation as an extremely poor 
screen against non-novel or otherwise invalid patents.” (citations omitted)); Jay P. Kesan, 
Carrots and Sticks to Create a Better Patent System, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 763, 765 
(2002). 
 9. Some scholars have argued that evidence of a weak patents “problem” is 
equivocal. For example, Adam Mossoff has noted that while bad actors have always 
existed in the patent system, “whether such bad actors exist in large enough numbers 
today to cause a breakdown in the patent system requiring a systemic intervention via 
legislation or regulation is an entirely different question—and it is a question that 
remains largely unanswered.” Demand Letters and Consumer Protection: Examining 
Deceptive Practices by Patent Assertion Entities: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Consumer Prot., Prod. Safety, and Ins. of the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., and Transp., 
113th Cong. 36 (2013) (Statement by Adam Mossoff, Professor of Law). Regardless, the 
“loser pays” proposal described here will improve patent application quality even if weak 
patenting does not rise to the level of a systemic problem. 
 10. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 1, at 88. 
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applications;11 costs borne by companies and market participants 
who face suit from weak patentees and must spend wastefully to 
avoid such suits;12 costs borne by society at large due to problems 
such as patent thickets and frivolous patent litigation;13 and 
costs borne by consumers who have to pay supra-competitive 
prices if a weak patentee is able to leverage her patent to 
exercise market power.14 
Scholars have generated a number of explanations for the 
presence of weak patents. Many of these theories focus on the 
details of the PTO examination process. For example, numerous 
scholars have suggested that patent applicants’ ability to file 
endless continuation applications, which precludes the PTO from 
finally rejecting a patent application, have led to a proliferation 
of weak patents.15 Others argue the PTO has insufficient time 
and resources to adequately review applications.16 And Michael 
Frakes and Melissa Wasserman posit that the way the PTO is 
financed might incentivize it to overgrant patents in certain 
technology areas.17 
                                            
 11. Lemley & Moore, supra note 4, at 74. 
 12. See, e.g., ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS, 
29–31 (3d prtg. 2007) (tracing the tremendous increase in patent applications, patent 
issuances, and patent litigation suits to the creation of the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit in 1982, which hears all patent appeals, and changes in how the 
PTO was financed in the early 1990s). 
 13. See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 6, at 124; Stuart J.H. Graham & Ted Sichelman, 
Why Do Start-Ups Patent?, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1063, 1068 (2008) (“[Because] patent 
litigation is uncertain, costly, and takes a long time to resolve[,] . . . patentees with weak 
patents are able to exploit the patent system by suing, or even by simply threatening to 
sue, their competitors.”). 
 14. Cf. Graham & Sichelman, supra note 13, at 1071 (“[T]he most common 
explanation for why patentees file is to protect their ability to maintain supra-competitive 
prices on their products and services.”). These costs include downstream effects, as 
improperly granted patents can stifle follow-on innovation. See, e.g., Alberto Galasso & 
Mark Schankerman, Patents and Cumulative Innovation: Causal Evidence from the 
Courts, 130 Q.J. ECON. 317, 320–23 (2015) (taking advantage of random assignment of 
federal circuit judges to empirically measure the effect of patent invalidation on 
subsequent innovation); Bhaven Sampat & Heidi L. Williams, How Do Patents Affect 
Follow-On Innovation? Evidence from the Human Genome (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 21666, 2015). 
 15. Lemley & Moore, supra note 4, at 68, 74–75; see also id. at 105–18 (suggesting 
ways to curb patent continuations). 
 16. See, e.g., Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Is the Time 
Allocated to Review Patent Applications Inducing Examiners to Grant Invalid 
Patents?: Evidence from Micro-Level Application Data 4, 19–20 (Nat’l Bureau of 
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 20337, 2014) (empirically finding that 
examiners have insufficient time to search for relevant prior art and reject patent 
applications). 
 17. See Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Does the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office Grant Too Many Bad Patents? Evidence from a Quasi-Experiment, 67 
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Other scholars have suggested the perceived increase in 
weak patents stems from unnecessary expansions in what 
constitutes patentable subject matter. For example, some have 
suggested that weak patents have increased due to the rise of 
business method and software patents,18 as well as the use of 
“functional claiming” for such inventions.19 Others suggest more 
generally that the patentable subject matter inquiry has strayed 
too far from patent law’s utilitarian underpinnings.20 
Commentators have also focused on how deficiencies in the 
patent litigation process can empower weak patentees and 
increase the damage they cause.21 Much of this discussion relates 
to patent trolls, who arguably hold up legitimate innovation by 
suing and seeking settlements from businesses that have 
incurred large fixed costs in creating products.22 Indeed, some 
scholars have suggested that patent trolls disproportionately use 
weak patents to achieve their goals.23 
But most of the scholarly discussion on weak patents 
glosses over a fundamental point: weak patents stem from 
weak patent applications.24 So why do people file weak 
                                            
STAN. L. REV. 613, 635, 644–45 (2015) (uses natural experiment to measure whether 
PTO’s inability to finally reject patent applications leads to patent overgranting). 
 18. See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 1, at 306 (“This chorus of complaints [about weak 
patents] enjoys an increasing resonance with regard to business methods, computer 
software, and other inventions that until recently were believed without the patent 
system.”); Kesan, supra note 8, at 765 (noting that the PTO’s “inability to accurately 
determine the scope of information that is already in the public domain or is the subject of 
other patents” is particularly problematic “in areas such as computer software where 
identifying the relevant prior art is often difficult”). 
 19. See Mark A. Lemley, Software Patents and the Return of Functional Claiming, 
2013 WIS. L. REV. 905, 907, 911–12 (2013) (explaining resurgence of functional claiming, 
where “software patentees have increasingly been claiming to own the function of their 
program, not merely the particular way they achieved that goal”). 
 20. See, e.g., David S. Olson, Taking the Utilitarian Basis for Patent Law Seriously: 
The Case for Restricting Patentable Subject Matter, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 181, 189, 215 (2009) 
(“The extension of patentability to new areas of innovation—some of which likely do not 
need the additional incentive—causes problems for the patent system in another way: it 
overburdens the patent office and, correspondingly, the PTO issues more bad patents.”); 
see also Alan Devlin & Neel Sukhatme, Self-Realizing Inventions and the Utilitarian 
Foundation of Patent Law, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 897, 939–45 (2009) (arguing against 
patent protection for certain types of business method patents). 
 21. See, e.g., R. Polk Wagner, Understanding Patent-Quality Mechanisms, 157 U. 
PA. L. REV. 2135, 2141–42 (2009) (“Perhaps the most obvious consequence of low patent 
quality is the increase in litigation observed over the past decade or so—both in terms of 
raw filings and ‘litigation intensity,’ gauged by the number of suits filed per in-force 
patent.”); Masur, supra note 8, at 691–92. 
 22. See Merges, supra note 7, at 1590–91. 
 23. See infra note 42 and accompanying text. 
 24. A notable exception is a recent article by Stephen Yelderman that focuses on 
ways to alter applicant incentives to improve patent application quality. See generally 
Yelderman, supra note 8. 
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applications? And how can we stop such applications from 
being filed or granted? 
The present Article recognizes that the current patent 
system inadvertently encourages the filing of weak applications 
due to an anomaly in how the PTO charges patent application 
fees. In particular, the Article recognizes a pricing problem: a 
successful patent applicant—that is, one who succeeds in 
obtaining a patent—ends up paying more fees than if he were 
unsuccessful and his application were rejected by the PTO. This 
pricing is precisely backwards: instead of supporting patent 
“winners” we are subsidizing patent “losers.”25 As explained 
below, such a policy has little merit from an economic standpoint. 
The Article then addresses this problem with a novel 
solution: we should incorporate loser-pays principles into patent 
examination. Put plainly, weak patent applications impose social 
costs and generate few social benefits. Such applications, which 
are more likely to fail the patent review process, should cost 
patent applicants significantly more money than they do 
currently. Because weak patent applications are less likely to 
pass PTO scrutiny than strong ones, by charging more to 
unsuccessful applicants we can disincentivize weak applications 
from being filed in the first place.26 And by using payments from 
“loser” applicants to subsidize “winner” applicants, we can 
                                            
 25. Of course the word “loser” as used here is not intended to cast any moral 
aspersion on these patent applicants—rather, it is simply a standard term borrowed from 
litigation to identify a class of applicants who should pay heightened patent fees under 
this proposal. The Article also deals with the issue of “undeserved losers”—those whose 
application was improperly denied. See infra notes 122–23 and accompanying text. 
 26. The Article’s novel proposal builds on previous scholarship related to patent fees 
and application quality. For example, Jay Thomas has argued that weak applications 
could be deterred by awarding a bounty to third parties who successfully challenge the 
validity of pending applications, with this bounty funded by a penalty paid by the 
applicant. See generally Thomas, supra note 1. Bernard Caillaud and Anne Duchêne 
present a technical model of patent prosecution, showing formally the potential benefits of 
introducing penalties for rejected applications. See Bernard Caillaud & Anne Duchêne, 
Patent Office in Innovation Policy: Nobody’s Perfect, 29 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 242, 243, 
247–48 (2011); Jing-Yuan Chiou, The Patent Quality Control Process: Can We Afford an 
(Rationally) Ignorant Patent Office? 13–14 (May 1, 2008) (unpublished manuscript) 
(http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1099948 [http://perma.cc/54ZY-YK 
T4]) (mentioning that application fees can be used to deter weak patents); see also Alan C. 
Marco & James E. Prieger, Congestion Pricing for Patent Applications 2–3 (Aug. 3, 2009) 
(unpublished manuscript) (http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1443470 
[http://perma.cc/M2XW-NHBC]) (proposing increase in application fees when there is a 
backlogged queue of applications). More recently, Stephen Yelderman focuses on 
applicant incentives and suggests requiring applicants to post completion bonds to deter 
amendment or cancellation of patent claims. See Yelderman, supra note 8, at 120–21; see 
also Masur, supra note 8, at 687 (arguing that the high cost of obtaining a patent “will 
disproportionately select against patents that are harmful to overall social welfare, while 
leaving beneficial patents almost entirely untouched”). 
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further incentivize the filing of better applications. Importantly, 
such a system will improve application quality, regardless 
whether we think weak patents rise to the level of a systemic 
problem.27 
In describing the merits of a loser-pays system, the Article 
explains how loser pays would deter two types of low-quality 
patent applications: those that would have been rejected anyway 
and those that would have resulted in weak patents. By 
deterring the former group, a loser-pays system relieves patent 
examiners from having to waste time on poor quality applications 
that they would have rejected anyway. By deterring the latter 
group, loser pays turns the uncertainty of patent approval into 
an efficiency-enhancing chilling effect, by stemming the inflow of 
applications that would have become weak patents. 
Moreover, the additional revenue raised from patent “losers” 
could be used to subsidize patent “winners,” such as by lowering 
fees when a patent issues. The Article describes a number of 
ways to structure this subsidy. For example, the subsidy amount 
could depend on the ratio of winners to losers within an invention 
classification. Accordingly, successful applications in a field filled 
with bad applications would receive a larger subsidy. Such an 
approach would allow loser pays to have the most bite in areas in 
which weak patent applications are the most problematic. 
The Article also explains how loser pays is especially 
advantageous when it is imported into an ex parte context or 
application setting, such as patent examination. For example, 
while loser pays might encourage strategic behavior by parties in 
traditional lawsuits, these concerns are absent in ex parte 
proceedings. As the Article details, a loser-pays, ex parte system 
merely forces an unsuccessful patent applicant to internalize a 
negative externality that it is imposing on others. 
More fundamentally, loser pays could positively shape ex 
ante applicant behavior. In particular, the Article discusses how 
loser pays gives potential applicants who are uncertain of the 
quality of their invention more incentive to assess quality before 
filing. By incentivizing such information gathering, loser pays 
will further increase the quality of filed applications. Moreover, 
the Article explains why a loser-pays system would be more 
effective in disincentivizing weak applications than merely 
raising front-end patent fees for all applicants. 
The Article proceeds as follows. Section II briefly surveys the 
leading theories on weak patents, focusing on patent 
                                            
 27. See generally Mossoff, supra note 9. 
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examination, patentable subject matter, and litigation. Section 
III identifies the essential pricing problem—namely, the PTO’s 
de facto “winner pays” system of patent fees. This section 
explains why such a pricing scheme does not make economic or 
policy sense. 
Section IV proceeds to review the economics of loser pays 
and explains its special virtues in ex parte proceedings and 
application settings. Section V then describes how loser pays 
could be incorporated into patent examination and discusses how 
recent passage of the America Invents Act might empower the 
PTO to implement loser pays without further congressional 
authorization. Section VI highlights potential pitfalls to avoid 
and features for policymakers to customize. Section VII 
concludes. 
II. EXISTING THEORIES ON WEAK PATENTS 
Many (though not all) scholars believe the presence of weak 
patents is one of the most pressing problems facing the U.S. 
patent system today.28 But they differ greatly on the proximate 
causes of this problem. This section briefly surveys the various 
dimensions of this scholarly discussion, which has focused largely 
on ineffective patent examination, overly expansive patentable 
subject matter, and inefficient patent litigation. 
A. Ineffective Examination 
A common refrain is that the U.S. Patent and Trademark 
Office does an inadequate job screening out weak patents.29 Some 
scholars believe this is because examiners have insufficient time 
and/or resources to conduct a proper examination.30 PTO 
examiners are allotted an average of 19 hours to review a patent 
application, from beginning to end.31 This is likely insufficient to 
determine whether the application meets the statutory standards 
                                            
 28. See supra note 9. 
 29. See, e.g., Kesan, supra note 8, at 765 (“Much of [the] criticism [of the PTO] is 
directed at the quality of the patents that are granted by the Patent Office. It is widely 
suggested that the Patent Office issues patents that are either ‘facially’ invalid or broader 
than the actual innovation disclosed in the patent application.”); see also Matthew Sag & 
Kurt Rohde, Patent Reform and Differential Impact, 8 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 1, 2, 8 
(2007) (“The United States patent system is facing a crisis of confidence. There is a 
widespread perception that changes in the standards of patentability, the increasing 
importance of the information economy and the sheer volume of applications before the 
United States Patent and Trademark Office (Patent Office) have combined to overwhelm 
the patent system.”). 
 30. See Frakes & Wasserman, supra note 16, at 8. 
 31. Id. 
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of patentability—most notably, whether it is novel and 
nonobvious. This problem is likely to be more acute for 
complicated technologies, such as in software or biotechnology.32 
Since it might be easier for an examiner just to approve an 
application than finally reject it, insufficient review time might 
lead to weak patent approvals.33 
So if we want to improve the PTO’s ability to reject weak 
patent applications, we might want to reform the examination 
process and, in particular, allocate more resources to examiners. 
This would give them more time to catch weak applications. But 
perhaps this would be a waste—as Mark Lemley has noted, since 
very few issued patents ever make it to litigation, it makes less 
sense to greatly increase spending up front on patent examination 
and more sense to try and improve the patent litigation process.34 
Moreover, the fundamental problem might not lie with the 
examiners at all, as weak patentability standards might be the 
underlying cause of weak patents. In particular, some scholars have 
favored combatting weak patents by raising the standard of 
nonobviousness—the requirement that an invention be nonobvious 
at the time it was invented to a person having ordinary skill in the 
relevant field of invention.35 
Although each of these approaches may reduce the number 
of weak patents, they all rely on the PTO to change its behavior. 
                                            
 32. See id. at 3 (using fact that allotted examination times decrease when 
examiners receive certain promotions to empirically assess the effect of a time crunch on 
the quality of examiner review); see id. at 2 n.3 (interviewing examiners about the time 
crunch, and as one noted “rather than doing what I feel is ultimately right, I’m essentially 
fighting for my life”); see also Olson, supra note 20, at 189–90. 
 33. This is because the United States, unlike other prominent patent jurisdictions, 
allows patent applicants to file unlimited continuation applications to keep prosecution 
going after a “final” rejection. Lemley & Moore, supra note 4, at 68. Many scholars have 
argued in favor of limiting or eliminating continuation applications to end this practice. 
See, e.g., id. at 93–94. 
 34. Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 
1495, 1496, 1501 (2001) (“Because so few patents are ever asserted against a competitor, 
it is much cheaper for society to make detailed validity determinations in those few cases 
than to invest additional resources examining patents that will never be heard from 
again. In short, the PTO doesn’t do a very detailed job of examining patents, but we 
probably don’t want it to.”). 
 35. As Gregory Mandel colorfully explains: “A dark storm is brewing around the 
core requirement that an invention be non-obvious to receive a patent. A loud, nearly 
universal, chorus contends that decision-makers apply the nonobviousness standard too 
leniently, allowing patent monopolies on trivial innovations with devastating effects.” 
Gregory Mandel, The Non-Obvious Problem: How the Indeterminate Nonobviousness 
Standard Produces Excessive Patent Grants, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 57, 59, 63–64 (2008). 
But see id. at 60 (using a model to argue that “the recent perceived surge in patent grants 
on obvious inventions may result not from too low a nonobviousness standard, but from 
an indeterminate nonobviousness requirement”). 
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As discussed later in this Article, a more powerful approach 
would be to change incentives so that applicants are less likely to 
file weak patent applications in the first place. 
B. Overly Expansive Patentable Subject Matter 
In recent years, many patent scholars have turned their 
attention to a fundamental question: should certain invention 
categories be eligible for patent protection in the first place?36 
The patentable subject matter debate has increased in ferocity 
over the past few years, driven in large part by the perceived rise 
of weak patents in software and business methods,37 and the 
questionable activities of patent trolls. This debate is not just 
academic, as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
(which hears all patent appeals) and the U.S. Supreme Court 
have increasingly suggested that whole categories of inventions 
might be non-patentable.38 Indeed, the future of medical 
diagnostic methods,39 business methods, and software as 
patentable subject matter is in significant doubt.40 
It is unclear where the current movement to curb patentable 
subject matter will end up. Even though weak patents pose 
significant costs, it is possible that limiting patentable subject 
matter might be a treatment that is worse than the disease. And 
even if narrowing patentable subject matter reduces the number 
of weak patents, it will only do so for those patents in the subject 
                                            
 36. See, e.g., Devlin & Sukhatme, supra note 20, at 909–10; Olson, supra note 20. 
 37. Companies began filing business method patents in increasing numbers after 
the Federal Circuit’s seminal State Street Bank decision in 1998. Devlin & Sukhatme, 
supra note 20, at 907; see also State St. Bank & Tr. Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., 149 F.3d 
1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 38. See, e.g. Olson, supra note 20, at 185 (discussing the Federal Circuit’s limitation 
of patentable subject matter); see also Jasper L. Tran, Software Patents: A One-Year 
Review of Alice v. CLS Bank, 97 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 532, 541–42 (2015) 
(estimating the majority of software patents are now invalid under Alice). 
 39. See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294 
(2012) (unanimously holding that a diagnostic process that used a metabolite level cutoff 
to determine whether dosage level was too high or too low was an unpatentable natural 
law); see also Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1373, 1378 (Fed. 
Cir. 2015) (applying Mayo and finding as unpatentable a method that determined fetal 
characteristics by collecting cell-free fetal DNA in maternal plasma and serum). 
 40. See Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2355–57 (2014) (holding 
that a computerized escrow service for facilitating financial transactions was an abstract 
idea not eligible for patent protection). Interestingly, changes to patent eligibility 
requirements might also affect patent prosecutors by altering the legal malpractice claims 
that might be brought against them. See, e.g., Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. v. Dickstein 
Shapiro LLP, 128 F. Supp. 3d 103, 110–11 (D.D.C. 2015), aff’d, No. 15-7100, 2016 WL 
3545138 (D.C. Cir. June 10, 2016) (awarding judgment on the pleadings to a patent law 
firm in a legal malpractice case where the firm missed a prosecution deadline because the 
underlying invention was not patent-eligible). 
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areas that are limited. For example, if the Supreme Court 
eventually eliminates all software patents, that would not 
directly affect weak patents in other areas. 
C. Inefficient Litigation 
Whatever problems might exist in examination have likely 
been exacerbated by inefficiencies in patent litigation. Patent 
infringement suits are among the most expensive and 
contentious of all legal cases. According to a 2009 study, the 
average patent infringement suit with at least $25 million at 
stake had $6.25 million in attorneys’ fees.41 And the number of 
such suits has greatly increased over the past twenty years.42 
This focus on litigation, in turn, inevitably turns toward 
patent trolls—patent-owning companies that do not practice the 
underlying inventions but seek to stop or obtain licensing 
payments from others who arguably practice the inventions. 
Some scholars associate patent trolls with the problem of weak 
patents. For example, John Allison, Mark Lemley, and Joshua 
Walker have shown that NPEs tend to assert weak patents, 
noting that the most litigated patents include ones owned by 
NPEs, and that these patents are most likely to fail when taken 
to a judgment.43 
Although reforming patent litigation rules could 
substantially reduce problems with weak patents, it is unlikely to 
be a total fix. Indeed, weak patents that are not litigated could 
still cause potential damage, as applicants are unsure whether 
they will ever be sued.44 Moreover, problems such as patent 
thickets will likely not be resolved by fixing patent litigation 
alone. 
                                            
 41. See Seaman, supra note 5, at 1725 (citing Am. Intell. Prop. L. Ass’n, Report of 
the Economic Survey 2009 at I-129 (2009)). 
 42. See, e.g., JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 12, at 29–31. 
 43. John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley & Joshua Walker, Patent Quality and 
Settlement Among Repeat Patent Litigants, 99 GEO. L.J. 677, 680–81, 692–93 (2011). Cf. 
George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 1, 17–24 (1984) (predicting that plaintiff win rates should be near 50% in cases that 
go to trial, which are cases in which divergent expectations of parties are sufficiently 
large to prevent settlement). Brian Love has also observed that NPEs disproportionately 
allege infringement based on patents (often software patents) that are nearing expiration. 
See Brian J. Love, An Empirical Study of Patent Litigation Timing: Could a Patent Term 
Reduction Decimate Trolls Without Harming Innovators?, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1309, 1312, 
1328–29, 1342–44 (2013). Software patents also seem more likely to be obsolete toward 
the end of their term, suggesting that many such suits might not be related to technology 
that existed when the patent was first issued. Id. at 1342. 
 44. See Wagner, supra note 21, at 2140 (noting uncertainty costs associated with too 
weak patents). 
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III. THE PROBLEM WITH PATENT PRICING 
The previous section explained how the weak patents 
discussion has largely centered on problems encountered during 
patent examination and litigation—after a patent has issued. But 
scholars have largely neglected an antecedent point: weak 
patents stem from weak patent applications.45 Indeed, such 
applications might be weaker than the underlying patent, since 
patent claims are often narrowed and clarified during 
prosecution in response to rejections from a patent examiner.46 
So we should ask: do current PTO policies encourage the 
filing of weak applications? Unfortunately, the answer is “yes.” 
As this section explains, the PTO’s current pricing system is de 
facto “winner pays,” where an applicant who succeeds in 
obtaining a patent pays higher fees than if that applicant had 
failed to obtain patent protection. This fee structure increases the 
prevalence of weak patents. 
A. PTO Financing and Patent Fees 
The PTO is financed in an unusual way. Unlike most other 
government agencies, the PTO depends on fees from its users 
(patent applicants and patentees) to fund its operations,47 which 
are principally patent examination costs.48 Accordingly, Congress 
(which historically has set these fees) and the PTO (which 
recently gained the power to adjust any patent fee) must decide 
on a fee structure that raises sufficient revenue to cover the 
PTO’s expenses.49 
                                            
 45. But see Yelderman, supra note 8, at 88–89 (focusing on weak patent application 
problem); see also Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, Ending the Patenting Monopoly, 
157 U. PA. L. REV. 1541, 1543–44, 1604 (2009) (proposing system of private patent 
examining firms, where the USPTO could randomly audit and fine firms that approve low 
quality patents); Wagner, supra note 21, at 2171 n.91 (noting that Abramowicz and Duffy 
use fines “to police poor quality prosecution providers rather than patentees themselves, 
but there is of course no reason that the basic structure of their approach could not be 
applied [to patentees as well]”); see also id. at 2146 (observing that “low patent quality” 
stems from “incentives that encourage patentees to draft patent applications that 
effectively obscure the true scope of the invention and its relationship to the prior art”). 
 46. See Thomas D. Brainard, Patent Claim Construction: A Graphic Look, 82 J. PAT. 
& TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 670, 673–74 (2000). 
 47. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2012, at 9 (2012), http://www.uspto.gov/about/stratplan/ar 
/USPTOFY2012PAR.pdf [http://perma.cc/6QQA-X4LM] [hereinafter 2012 PTO REPORT]. 
The PTO became fully dependent on user fees in 1990 as part of the Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act (OBRA), Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388, 1388–91 (1990). Id. 
 48. 2012 PTO REPORT, supra note 47, at 72. 
 49. Leahy–Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. 112-29, § 10, 125 Stat. 284, 316 
(2011); H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, at 49 (2011). In particular, the PTO gained the power to set 
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Every applicant must pay at least some fees to the PTO, 
whether their application finally issues into a patent or not. 
Other fees must be paid only by those who successfully obtain a 
patent. As shown below, it is this dynamic, combined with the 
PTO’s unusual financing structure, that creates a system of 
“winner pays” pricing for patents. 
1. Front-End Fees and RCEs. The first fees that all patent 
applicants must pay are known as “front-end fees.”50 Although 
the PTO breaks these fees into three categories (“filing,” “search,” 
and “examination”), all three are required and due upon filing.51 
These fees must be paid regardless whether one’s application 
succeeds or fails. 
Front-end fees are intended to pay for patent examination—
namely, the process by which the PTO determines whether an 
application meets the statutory criteria for patentability.52 In 
reality, however, “the Office sets basic ‘front-end’ fees . . . below 
the actual cost of carrying out [patent examination].”53 Not 
surprisingly, then, front-end fees are relatively low—$1,600, even 
though the estimated average total cost of examining a utility 
patent application in 2011 was $3,569.54 
                                            
or adjust any patent fee as part of the America Invents Act (AIA). See Leahy–Smith 
America Invents Act, Pub. L. 112-29, § 10, 125 Stat. 284, 316 (2011). 
 50. Any reference to “patent” in this Article refers to utility patents. The PTO does 
issue two other kinds of patents (design and plant), but the vast majority of patented 
inventions receive utility patents. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 161, 171 (2012); see, e.g., U.S. PATENT 
AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. PATENT STATISTICS CHART, Calendar Years 1963–2015, 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.htm [http://perma.cc/7K2R-LZ3G] 
(showing that utility applications comprised over 94% of patent filings and grants in 
2014). 
 51. See 35 U.S.C. § 41; MPEP § 607 (9th ed. Rev. 7, Nov. 2015). 
 52. In particular, an invention that covers patentable subject matter must be useful, 
novel, and nonobvious to a person having ordinary skill in the relevant art. 35 U.S.C.  
§§ 101–03. Showing that a patent is useful (also called the “utility” requirement) is not a 
significant barrier for most applicants. Applicants generally need only show the invention has 
some minimal benefit and could at least theoretically be used. See Nathan Machin, Prospective 
Utility: A New Interpretation of the Utility Requirement of Section 101 of the Patent Act, 87 CAL. 
L. REV. 421, 426, 433 (1999). An invention typically lacks novelty if it was described in an 
earlier-filed patent or published patent application with another inventor, or if it was 
“patented, described in a printed publication, or in public use, on sale, or otherwise available to 
the public before the effective filing date of the claimed invention.” 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) (2012). 
Nonobviousness is often the toughest hurdle for patent applicants to surmount, and has been 
called the “ultimate condition of patentability.” See, e.g., Jeanne C. Fromer, The Layers of 
Obviousness in Patent Law, 22 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 75, 75 (2008) (citing NONOBVIOUSNESS—
THE ULTIMATE CONDITION OF PATENTABILITY (John F. Witherspoon ed., 1980)). 
 53. Setting and Adjusting Patent Fees, 78 Fed. Reg. 4212, 4216 (Jan. 18, 2013) (to 
be codified at 37 C.F.R. pts. 1, 41, and 42). 
 54. The PTO recently increased front-end fees for utility patents from $1,260 to $1,600 
in 2013 by exercising new fee-setting authority granted to it under the America Invents Act. Id. 
at 4227. 
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Patent applicants might also pay other fees during 
prosecution.55 For example, an examiner often issues a “final 
office action” that rejects an application. But a final office action 
is not really final. Rather, an applicant can always continue 
prosecuting her application by filing a request for continued 
examination (RCE) and paying the associated fee.56 Doing so 
repeatedly allows the applicant to continue prosecution 
indefinitely,57 perhaps until she has sufficiently worn down the 
examiner or persuaded him the invention is patentable.58 Both 
unsuccessful applicants and ones who are eventually successful 
might decide to pay RCE fees during prosecution.59 
Like front-end fees, the PTO subsidizes RCE fees. Until 
recently, RCE fees were $930 for each RCE that an applicant 
chose to file.60 This was significantly below the “average historic 
cost of performing the services associated with an RCE 
($1,882)[.]”61 Perhaps mindful of this disparity, the PTO 
increased fees in 2013 to $1,200 for the first RCE and $1,700 for 
any subsequent RCE.62 Still, this fee structure maintains a 
“subsidization design” to keep the price for first RCEs at about 
75% of their processing cost.63 
Why does the PTO subsidize front-end fees and RCE fees? It 
explains that doing so “enables the Office to provide lower costs 
to enter the patent system, making it easier for inventors to 
pursue patents for their innovations . . . . [which in turn] foster[s] 
                                            
 55. Applicants often incur extension fees when they take longer than the statutory 
minimum time to respond to the patent application. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.17(a) (2015) ($200 
fee for one-month extension, $600 fee for two-month extension, and $1,400 fee for 
three-month extension). 
 56. In 2013, the PTO exercised its authority under the America Invents Act and 
increased RCE fees to $1,200 for the first request and $1,700 for each subsequent request. 
See Setting and Adjusting Patent Fees, 78 Fed. Reg. at 4228–29. Prior to that, RCE fees 
were $930 for each request (whether first or subsequent). Id. So the cost for filing an RCE 
is at most slightly more than the initial front-end fees. 
 57. See supra note 33. 
 58. Alternatively, an applicant who faces a final rejection can appeal to the Patent 
Trial and Appeal Board. See 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) (2012). The current fee for such an appeal 
is $800, with an additional $1,300 due upon requesting an oral argument before the 
Board. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.20(b)(1)–(b)(3) (2013). 
 59. This might be a category of fees that weak applicants are more likely to pay, 
since their applications might be more likely to receive final rejections and hence require 
RCEs. See Yelderman, supra note 8, at 82–83. Still, any given applicant pays more total 
fees if her application eventually ripens into a patent as compared to if her application 
fails and is abandoned. 
 60. Setting and Adjusting Patent Fees, 78 Fed. Reg. at 4224. As of 2013, about 30% 
of applicants who filed an RCE filed two or more RCEs. Id. at 4229. 
 61. Id. at 4245. 
 62. Id. at 4224. 
 63. Id. at 4246. 
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innovation by facilitating access to the patent system.”64 So by 
lowering front-end application fees, which both successful and 
unsuccessful patent applicants must pay, the PTO makes access 
to the patent system relatively inexpensive. To the extent we 
believe that patents incentivize innovation, having lower 
front-end fees should increase innovation.65 
2. Back-End Fees. Given the way the PTO is financed, 
having front-end fees and RCE fees that are below cost implies 
that the PTO must obtain additional revenue from someplace 
else. This revenue comes from back-end fees, which are paid only 
by successful patent applicants.66 
The first set of back-end fees are issue fees, which are due 
after the PTO sends a notice of allowance on claims in the 
application. Currently, issue fees are $960,67 which greatly 
exceeds the PTO’s estimated cost of $257 in actually issuing a 
patent.68 If the PTO does not approve a patent application, 
that applicant never has to pay an issue fee. So unsuccessful 
applicants never have to pay issue fees. 
Next, after a patent issues, a patentee must pay periodic 
maintenance fees to prevent her patent from lapsing. Such fees are 
due at three-and-a-half, seven-and-a-half, and eleven-and-a-half 
years after patent issuance.69 These fees are $1,600, $3,600, and 
$7,400, respectively.70 Since it costs the PTO virtually nothing to 
maintain a patent, these fees are priced well above cost.71 
Maintenance fees, then, are another category of fees that successful 
patent applicants must pay to keep their patents from lapsing.72 
                                            
 64. Id. at 4214 (emphasis omitted). 
 65. See id. at 4216; see also Neel U. Sukhatme, Regulatory Monopoly and 
Differential Pricing in the Market for Patents, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1855, 1885–86 
(2014) (“[D]iscounting (whether hyperbolic or not) suggests that changes in front-end fees 
will affect potential patent applicants’ behavior more than similar changes to back-end 
fees.”). 
 66. See Setting and Adjusting Patent Fees, 78 Fed. Reg. at 4214 (“The [PTO’s] 
current fee structure includes statutory fees (set by Congress) that provide lower, below 
cost fees on the front end of the patent process (e.g., filing, searching, and examination 
fees), which are in turn balanced out by higher, above cost fees on the back end (i.e., issue 
and maintenance fees).”). 
 67. See id. at 4236. 
 68. Id. Until recently, this disparity was even greater—issue fees were $1,770 until 
the PTO reduced them in 2013. Id. 
 69. See 35 U.S.C. § 41(b)(1)–(b)(2) (2012) (stating that patentees have up to six 
months to pay maintenance fees, so long as they pay a surcharge). 
 70. Setting and Adjusting Patent Fees, 78 Fed. Reg. at 4236. 
 71. Id. at 4237. In 2013, these fees were increased from $1,150, $2,900, and $4,810, 
respectively. Id. at 4236–37. 
 72. See id. at 4237. 
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B. “Winner Pays” Pricing and Weak Patents 
The presence of issue fees and maintenance fees is why a 
patent “winner,” whose application is approved, pays higher fees 
than if he had been a patent “loser.” But how does “winner pays” 
pricing encourage weak patent applications? 
The answer lies in an asymmetry between weak and 
non-weak applications. In particular, each patent applicant 
always has an outside option: to abandon her application and 
curtail any costs going forward. This option is generally more 
valuable for weak applicants than non-weak ones. 
To understand why, consider an individual with a marginal 
invention that he knows might not be patentable. This individual 
might rationally file a weak patent application, since the cost of 
failure is relatively low but the potential upside is high.73 Indeed, 
given the low cost of filing and the non-zero chance that any 
application will be rejected, the applicant could file a number of 
related applications. Such an applicant might view each 
application probabilistically (like a lottery ticket)74 and the whole 
slew of applications like assets in a portfolio.75 
If the individual is lucky, he might sneak one or more of 
his applications past an overworked or underprepared 
examiner, who misses relevant prior art and fails to reject the 
weak application. If the individual is unlucky, all he has lost 
are front-end application fees and the expense of preparing the 
application. He need not pay any back-end fees, and he is not 
punished for submitting a low-quality application. Moreover, 
the applicant can always exercise his option to abandon his 
                                            
 73. The potential upside may be high even for a marginal invention because it is 
often difficult for an outside party to assess how much a patent is worth, and hence, the 
patent might have high value in litigation or licensing. See Allison et al., supra note 43, at 
710–11. This might be particularly problematic in more “abstract” inventive categories, 
such as software and business methods. Id. Moreover, an individual might have dozens or 
even hundreds of (potentially weak) patents, making the valuation problem significantly 
more complicated. The patentee could then leverage this stack of patents into a favorable 
settlement or licensing agreement, a practice that is likely the business model for many 
patent assertion entities. 
 74. See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, J. ECON. PERSP., 
Spring 2005, at 75, 80–83; see also id. at 75 (“When a patent holder asserts its patent 
against an alleged infringer, the patent holder is rolling the dice. If the patent is found 
invalid, the property right will have evaporated.”). 
 75. See Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1, 5–6, 27 (2005) (“The true value of patents inheres not in their individual worth, 
but in their aggregation into a collection of related patents—a patent portfolio.”). The 
incentives for multiple filings also stem to some extent from the fact that there is likely to 
be a significant fixed cost for filing one patent application, but lesser marginal costs for 
additional related applications, since large portions of the first application can be reused 
in subsequent filings. Id. at 52–53. 
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application and thereby not incur any more patent-related 
fees. 
Contrast this applicant to an inventor who has an invention 
he truly believes is novel and valuable. Because he values his 
invention more highly, he is less likely to exercise his outside 
option to abandon. Rather, this applicant is more likely to pursue 
prosecution all the way through, and to pay any back-end fees 
required to issue and maintain his patent. 
In addition, in some ways a low-value inventor faces lower 
costs than a high-value inventor. This is because a potential cost 
of patent application filing is the disclosure of the invention to 
competitors.76 To the extent we believe this disclosure is costly to 
the applicant and valuable to the recipient (which is disputed 
among scholars), the cost of such disclosure is lower for weak 
applicants than stronger ones, because a weak applicant is not 
disclosing anything of value.77 
These examples demonstrate that the type of applicant who 
is most likely to abandon prosecution is one for whom the 
resulting patent is worth less anyway, because his invention has 
low private value. As Jonathan Masur has argued, weak 
patentees are more likely to have this sort of application, since 
patents that have low private value are more likely to also have 
low social value.78 And patents that have low social value are 
more likely to be weak patents.79 
One can also look at the problem in terms of price 
sensitivity. Weak patent applicants are more likely than 
non-weak applicants to be price sensitive when it comes to patent 
                                            
 76. See Alan Devlin, The Misunderstood Function of Disclosure in Patent Law, 23 
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 401, 414 (2010) (noting that reverse engineering of products by 
competitors can drive down price and prevent the inventor from recouping costs of 
research and development). 
 77. See, e.g., id. at 403–04 (“[T]he extent to which patent documents successfully 
teach the inner workings of cutting-edge technologies is quite limited . . . to the extent 
patents are drafted in a manner that is actually capable of conveying accurate 
information, third parties’ disinterest stymies the disclosure function.”); Note, The 
Disclosure Function of the Patent System (or Lack Thereof), 118 HARV. L. REV. 2007, 
2019–20 (2005). But see Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Do Patents Disclose Useful 
Information?, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 545, 566–67 (2012) (finding via surveys that 
nanotechnology researchers did not avoid reading patents out of fear of infringement). 
 78. See Masur, supra note 8, at 689, 701–02. In particular, Masur distinguishes 
between a patent’s private value (its value to its owner) and its social value (its value to 
society). Id. He argues that patents with low private value but high social value are likely 
to be very rare, and that patents with high social value are likely to have high private 
value, because of the monopoly rights awarded to the patentee. Id. at 690, 702. 
Accordingly, high up front patent costs likely discourage patents that have low private 
value and low social value, which is socially optimal. See id. at 690–91, 702–03. 
 79. Id. at 702, 710–11. 
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fees, since they have less to gain from an issued patent. As such, 
a winner pays system, with low front-end costs, 
disproportionately benefits them, as it requires few up front 
expenses and charges more to those who actually succeed in 
obtaining patent protection. 
Even more problematic, a winner pays system gives an 
inventor little incentive to assess the quality of her invention up 
front, since she doesn’t pay anything extra if her application fails. 
This is especially unfortunate because the inventor is likely in 
the best position to assess whether her invention is patentable 
(i.e., whether it comprises patentable subject matter that is novel 
and non-obvious).80 
Of course, the argument here does not mean the patent 
system should abolish back-end fees. Indeed, such fees can be 
useful—for example, back-end maintenance fees can be used to 
weed out patents that no longer have much value, since these 
fees must be paid at periodic intervals after a patent has issued 
and they cannot be prepaid.81 Hence, a patentee must keep track 
when her maintenance fees are due and budget so that the fees 
can be paid at the appropriate time to keep the patent from 
lapsing. 
But while back-end fees have some justification, we create 
new problems when successful applicants are asked to pay higher 
fees than unsuccessful ones. Put differently, weak patents stem 
to a large extent from the fact that we let unsuccessful patent 
applicants off cheaply while asking successful patentees to foot 
the bill. In an ideal system, the weak patentees would be asked 
to pay at least to the same extent as the non-weak patentees. 
                                            
 80. Winner-pays pricing exacerbates another problem with inventor information 
gathering that has been identified by previous scholars: the presence of willful 
infringement penalties, which arguably discourage patent applicants from researching 
relevant prior art. See, e.g., Devlin, supra note 76, at 404; Mark A. Lemley & Ragesh K. 
Tangri, Ending Patent Law’s Willfulness Game, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1085, 1100–01 
(2003). 
 81. John M. Golden, Patent Privateers: Private Enforcement’s Historical Survivors, 
26 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 545, 603 (2013) (analogizing to patent enforcement and noting that 
“privateering regulations restricted entry to the business by requiring posting of a 
substantial bond, thereby both restricting the numbers of investors or groups of investors 
who could support privateering ventures”); see id. (“Sharply increased fees or, at least, 
altered fee schedules for patent prosecution and maintenance might be one way of helping 
to stem a perceived flood of poor-quality patents.” (citing Brian J. Love, Let’s Use Patent 
Fees to Stop the Trolls, WIRED (Dec. 20, 2012), http://www.wired.com/opinion 
/2012/12/how-to-stop-patent-trolls-lets-use-fees [http://perma.cc/5VVU-T2S2]) (proposing 
increasing maintenance fee toward end of patent term to deter troll litigation)). 
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IV. THE ECONOMICS OF LOSER PAYS 
The last section described how the current patent system 
has a de facto winner pays pricing regime that encourages weak 
applications. The next two sections explain the features of 
loser-pays systems, and how the PTO could adopt such a system 
to better disincentivize weak applications. 
The present section begins with a brief overview of the 
previous scholarly literature on loser pays, which has focused on 
the traditional litigation context. It further describes how fee 
shifting might have special benefits in ex parte proceedings or 
application settings, a more general point that has been 
neglected by scholars. This discussion sets up Section V, which 
applies loser pays to patent examination. 
A. Loser Pays in Inter Partes Proceedings 
Many scholars have studied loser-pays systems (also known 
as fee-shifting or “English rule” systems)82 in the context of 
litigation. The benefits and costs of loser pays vis-à-vis 
non-loser-pays systems (also known as “American rule” 
systems)83 are well known but worth reviewing in this context. 
A chief advantage of loser pays in litigation is that it 
arguably disincentivizes the filing of frivolous cases.84 To 
illustrate, suppose a plaintiff is deciding whether to bring a 
frivolous suit against a defendant. In a non-loser-pays 
jurisdiction, a plaintiff knows a defendant might settle such a 
case, even though it lacks merit, just to avoid paying attorneys’ 
fees. In a loser-pays jurisdiction, by contrast, the defendant is 
less likely to settle, since he knows that he can recover his 
attorneys’ fees if he prevails, as is likely. As such, there is less 
incentive ex ante for the plaintiff to bring a frivolous “strike suit” 
in a loser-pays jurisdiction. 
Another advantage is that loser pays enables some plaintiffs 
with deserving claims but limited resources to bring suit. This is 
because these plaintiffs anticipate winning the suit and recovering 
their attorneys’ fees. Accordingly, high attorneys’ fees are unlikely 
to deter these plaintiffs from filing their meritorious claims. 
                                            
 82. Walter Olson & David Bernstein, Loser Pays: Where Next?, 55 MD. L. REV. 1161, 
1161 & n.1 (1996). 
 83. Id. 
 84. See, e.g., id. at 1161 (claiming that loser pays “discourages speculative 
litigation—among the most persistent problems facing the American litigation system—
and it limits the tactical leverage parties with weak cases can obtain by threatening to 
inflict the cost of litigation on their opponents.”). 
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Loser pays has some well-known disadvantages as well. For 
example, a sufficiently risk-averse plaintiff might not bring suit 
or will accept a less favorable settlement under a loser-pays 
system even if she has a meritorious claim.85 To illustrate, 
suppose you are an individual plaintiff suing a large corporation 
on a shareholder derivative suit. Even if you have a meritorious 
case, there is likely a non-zero probability you will lose. If you are 
sufficiently risk-averse and do not have much saved capital, you 
might forego suit, despite the strength of your case. Given that 
meritorious derivative suits have positive externalities (that is, 
society benefits when they are successfully brought because they 
deter bad corporate conduct), society as a whole is worse off 
because you did not sue. 
Loser pays also increases the possibility for strategic 
behavior by parties by encouraging them to increase their 
litigation expenses in order to induce settlement.86 To illustrate, 
suppose you are an individual patentee with a highly meritorious 
claim of patent infringement against a large corporation. If you 
are litigating in a loser-pays jurisdiction, then the corporate 
defendant could rack up exorbitant legal expenses, not because it 
needs to but because it wants to pressure you to settle. Knowing 
that you would be unable to pay these expenses in the possible 
but unlikely scenario in which you lose, you might be more 
willing to settle the case earlier for a smaller amount. 
                                            
 85. See, e.g., ALAN DEVLIN, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, 225 
(2015) (“For any given case, the possible payoffs under a ‘loser-pays’ system vary more 
than under the American rule. For that reason, a trial is even less attractive to a 
risk-averse litigant under the English rule than it is under a regime in which each side 
bears its own costs.”); see also Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal 
Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399, 428 (1973) (“The greater 
variance of returns under the English rule makes the expected value of litigation less for 
risk-averse litigants, which will encourage settlements if risk aversion is more common 
than risk preference.”). 
 86. The potential distortions caused by loser pays in litigation are well known. See, 
e.g., Anup Malani & Jonathan S. Masur, Raising the Stakes in Patent Cases, 101 GEO. L.J. 
637, 673 (2013) (“[I]t is well understood that the English Rule can cause distortions in 
litigation behavior by encouraging litigants to increase their litigation expenditures, 
figuring that their opponents will eventually have to pay.” (citing Robert D. Cooter & 
Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their Resolution, 27 J. 
ECON. LIT. 1067, 1073 (1989))); see also James W. Hughes & Edward A. Snyder, Litigation 
and Settlement Under the English and American Rules: Theory and Evidence, 38 J. LAW & 
ECON. 225, 227 (1995) (“It is well established in both the theoretical and empirical 
literature that the English rule causes litigants to increase their legal expenditures. 
Litigants expect, with some positive probability, that their legal fees will be paid by their 
rival. The higher the litigant’s subjective probability of winning at trial, the lower is the 
party’s expected marginal cost of potentially compensable expenditures.”). 
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B. Loser Pays in Ex Parte or Application Settings 
Although loser pays has been well-studied in litigation, 
scholars have typically overlooked its potential in ex parte 
proceedings and application settings. This is not surprising, 
because it’s not readily apparent what fee shifting means in this 
context. Most basically, how can there be both a “winner” and a 
“loser” if there is only one party involved in a proceeding? And 
regardless, how would fees be shifted from one party to the 
other? 
The key insight here is that even though parties may be 
involved in separate proceedings, the administrative or 
decision-making body that interacts with them can shift fees 
across these proceedings. So even though there cannot be both a 
“winner” and a “loser” in any one proceeding, there are winners 
and losers in separate proceedings, and fees can be transferred 
among them. 
Such an approach retains many of the advantages of loser 
pays in the traditional, inter partes context—namely, the threat 
of punishment (for the loser) and reward (for the winner) can 
curb frivolous applications and encourage good ones, as a 
meritorious applicant anticipates being reimbursed for her fees. 
Moreover, some of the disadvantages of loser pays that arise 
in inter partes proceedings are not present in the ex parte 
setting. For example, we are concerned in litigation that parties 
will strategically rack up high attorneys’ fees because my loss is 
directly your gain—if you strategically incur higher attorney fees 
and win, that raises my costs. When two parties are going 
head-to-head in a zero-sum fight, it makes sense for them to 
manipulate their fees to increase their leverage and try to induce 
a favorable settlement. 
These issues are much reduced or even absent in the context 
of ex parte or applications settings. In such cases, separate 
parties are not adverse to one another. Rather, they each have 
separate proceedings before some decision-maker (in the case of 
patents, the PTO).87 If the number of proceedings or applications 
before a decision-maker is large (as is the case with the PTO), it 
seems unlikely that parties have any strong incentive to act 
strategically to affect other parties’ fees. 
                                            
 87. In other instances, the decision-maker might be another administrative agency, 
an adjudicative body or even a non-governmental institution. For example, the Article 
briefly discusses later how loser pays could be applied to the law review submissions 
process. See infra note 150. In that context, a law review articles committee might be the 
decision-maker. 
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To be sure, this is not to say that loser-pays systems are 
unequivocally better than non-loser-pays systems in all ex parte 
contexts. As noted for litigation, a sufficiently risk-averse 
plaintiff in a loser-pays system might forego suit even if she has 
a meritorious claim. Such concerns might still arise for similar 
individuals in a loser-pays ex parte system, as a sufficiently 
risk-averse individual (perhaps one with limited resources) might 
forego initiating an otherwise meritorious ex parte proceeding. 
Still, such problems will often be surmountable. As discussed 
below in the patent context, we might expect such individuals to 
be small or micro entities, which are groups that already receive 
a fee discount in their patent fees. If groups of people who are 
resource-constrained can be identified ex ante, then pricing could 
be altered for them, to prevent their risk aversion from shutting 
them out of the system altogether.88 
Regardless, the present Article shows how loser pays is an 
underappreciated but potentially valuable tool in ex parte 
proceedings and application settings. It is likely to be most 
valuable in any context in which applicants face low costs but 
potential high benefits in applying. This is particularly true 
when there are significant costs associated with filtering out bad 
applications, or allowing bad applications to be approved. In this 
sense, loser pays raises the stakes of the application proceeding, 
which often leads applicants’ incentives to become better aligned 
with social incentives. 
V. IMPLEMENTING LOSER PAYS IN PATENT EXAMINATION 
The idea of raising stakes to improve outcomes in patent 
litigation is not a new one. Indeed, Anup Malani and 
Jonathan Masur have suggested that doing so might help 
address the weak patents problem.89 Others have looked more 
                                            
 88. This kind of differential pricing is called third-degree price discrimination. See 
Sukhatme, supra note 65, at 1875, 1886–87. See also id. at 1887 n.121 (“It is reasonable to 
assume that given their small size, [small and micro entities] have a lower willingness or 
ability to pay PTO fees than other patent applicants. Accordingly, by charging these 
individuals less money, the PTO is, on the margin, allowing some small entities or 
micro-entities to enter the market for patents when they would otherwise be priced out if 
they did not receive any discounts.”). 
 89. See Malani & Masur, supra note 86, at 686–87 (proposing “patents [that] are 
upheld at trial be given a reward—in the form of a patent extension—on top of the 
damages they usually get in court. Similarly, patent owners whose patents are held 
invalid by a court should be forced to pay a penalty to patent challengers.”). Cf. id. at 674 
(noting in the context of patent litigation that fee shifting “could unreasonably diminish 
incentives to bring patent challenges, including worthwhile challenges to invalid 
patents”). 
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directly at the effect of fee shifting in the context of patent 
litigation.90 
But there has been no systematic study of how loser-pays 
rules might be adapted to patent examination. Because patent 
examination is an ex parte proceeding, the way in which fee 
shifting might work in this context is more subtle. This section 
proposes some possible ways to implement loser pays in patent 
examination to deter weak applications. 
A. Fee Forfeitures and Fee Refunds 
If we want to implement loser pays in patents, what is the 
best way to do so? A naïve approach would be to levy a penalty on 
an applicant at the end of patent examination. In such a system, 
for example, an applicant might be charged a fee after he 
receives a final rejection, he declines to appeal, and he does not 
file an RCE. 
The problems with such a system are plain. Although this 
approach would disincentivize the filing of bad applications, it 
would also create a perverse incentive to file RCEs in an attempt 
to stave off paying the final penalty. The goal of loser pays is to 
limit bad applications, not to encourage applicants to double 
down on them, which is what applicants would do in such a 
system. 
Moreover, this sort of system would be hard to administer—
indeed, the PTO would have to compel an applicant to pay fees at 
the end of prosecution, after he has lost his chance to get a 
patent. Although there might be ways to compel compliance 
(perhaps through the tax system, or by blacklisting a 
noncompliant applicant from future filings), such heavy-handed 
techniques seem less than optimal. 
                                            
 90. See, e.g., Mark Liang & Brian Berliner, Fee Shifting in Patent Litigation, 18 VA. 
J.L. & TECH. 59, 66, 92–93 (2013) (concluding that “fee shifting might not reduce the 
number of patent cases and would not drive down the cost of cases that are filed”); Kesan, 
supra note 8, at 795–96 (arguing in favor of one-way fee shifting in favor of accused 
infringers); SOLVEIG SINGLETON, PATENTS AND LOSER PAYS: WHY NOT?, PROGRESS ON 
POINT 4–5 (2006), http://www.pff.org/issues-pubs/pops/pop13.3patents_losers.pdf (arguing 
that fee shifting might reduce nuisance suits); Ranganath Sudarshan, Nuisance-Value 
Patent Suits: An Economic Model and Proposal, 25 SANTA CLARA COMP. & HIGH TECH. 
L.J. 159, 181 (2009) (noting that fee-shifting rule would be over-inclusive, since “a 
legitimate (non-nuisance) patent plaintiff simply cannot know a priori whether a patent is 
valid or infringed with certainty”); Neal S. Vickery, Don’t Forget About the Little Guys: 
Trolls, Startups, and Fee Shifting, 13 COLO. TECH. L.J. 171, 171, 190 (2015) (noting that 
fee shifting “has not been a substantial deterrent to frivolous lawsuits from sophisticated 
plaintiffs” because it occurs post judgment); see id. at 172, 182–83 (proposes that a patent 
“plaintiff [should be required] to post a bond that can be used to cover some or all of the 
costs of discovery, which will be repaid if the startup is found to be infringing”). 
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A somewhat better approach to implement loser pays would 
be to require applicants to post a bond at the outset, when they 
file their patent application. Some or all of this bond could then 
be returned to the applicant when she succeeds in obtaining a 
notice of allowance.91 Moreover, as discussed later,92 this bond 
could be supplemented with an additional monetary reward that 
comes from “loser applicants.” 
Still, a system that ties returning the bond to receiving a 
notice of allowance would be less than ideal. This is because a 
notice of allowance is awarded only at the end of a successful 
prosecution.93 So this system would give weak applicants a 
greater incentive to never abandon their applications—rather, 
they will fight, perhaps by filing one or more RCEs or appeals. As 
noted above, this is not something we want to encourage.94 
Instead, a better idea is to return an upfront bond only if the 
applicant obtains a notice of allowance before receiving a final 
rejection. To illustrate, suppose the applicant is required to 
submit a $10,000 bond upon filing his application. If the 
applicant receives a notice of allowance without ever being finally 
rejected, he will recover his entire bond.95 On the other hand, if 
the applicant receives a final rejection, he would lose the bond, 
even if he subsequently obtains a patent after filing an RCE or 
pursuing an appeal.96 
Note that the amount returned to a winning applicant could 
be calibrated based on the PTO’s policy objective.97 For example, 
instead of returning the full $10,000, the PTO might instead 
return only a portion of the bond to a winning applicant. For 
example, if the PTO returns $8,400, then a winning applicant 
                                            
 91. Stephen Yelderman recently proposed a somewhat similar scheme in which 
applicants could post a per-claim completion bond that they would forfeit when they 
amend or cancel their claims. See Yelderman, supra note 8, at 120–21. His goal was to 
curtail applicants’ practice of filing broad claims that could be narrowed later in 
prosecution. Id. 
 92. See infra section V.C. 
 93. Yelderman, supra note 8, at 82. 
 94. Another problem with that approach is that applicants could file broad, weak 
claims and simply narrow them during prosecution until they receive a notice of 
allowance and hence, a bond refund. Id. at 103. Since applicants would know this ex ante, 
it would blunt the impact of loser pays in deterring weak applications from being filed in 
the first place. 
 95. The simple examples discussed here ignore the time value of money, though 
that could certainly also be taken into account by returning the bond with interest. 
 96. Yelderman, supra note 8, at 120–21. 
 97. Currently, fees are returned to applicants only if the fee was mistakenly paid or 
in excess of what was required, or if the PTO chooses not to institute a reexamination 
proceeding in response to a request for reexamination or supplemental examination. See 
MPEP, § 607.02 (9th ed. Rev. 7, Nov. 2015). 
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would end up paying $10,000 – $8,400 = $1,600, which is the 
current front-end fee. Under such a system, a winning applicant 
would end up spending the same amount as an applicant under 
the current system ($1,600), and a losing applicant would end up 
spending much more ($10,000). 
The loser-pays systems described here would deter the 
filing of weak applications, so long as weak applications are 
more likely on average to receive a final rejection than strong 
ones. This last assertion will be true if PTO examiners are, at 
least to some extent, correctly identifying and rejecting weak 
applications.98 
Put differently, even though many weak applications become 
patents, a weak application should on average be less likely to 
pass PTO muster as compared to a strong one, all else being 
equal. Apart from its intuitive appeal, there is also data to 
suggest this baseline assertion is true.99 
Accordingly, a loser-pays system like the one envisioned 
here would decrease the returns from filing weak applications, 
thereby deterring such applications from ever being filed. 
Moreover, the system would encourage applicants to improve 
their application quality, such as by narrowing their claims 
                                            
 98. Some have argued that the PTO’s compensation scheme encourages examiners 
to approve patent applications. See, e.g., Florian Schuett, Patent Quality and Incentives at 
the Patent Office, 44 RAND J. OF ECON. 313, 328–29 (2013) (explaining that PTO 
examiners receive a bonus based on the number of applications processed, which would 
bias them toward application approval); JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 12, at 136; Frakes & 
Wasserman, supra note 16, at 72–74, 72 n.16, 73 n.18. Others have suggested the opposite 
might sometimes be true. See Sean Tu, The Luck/Unluck of the Draw: An Empirical 
Study of Examiner Allowance Rates, 2012 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 7, 
http://journals.law.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/stanford-technology-law-review/online/ 
tu-luckunluckofthedraw.pdf [http://perma.cc/H3YX-JVAA] (arguing that the PTO’s 
“count” system, which is used to judge examiner productivity, “gives junior examiners a 
greater incentive to reject patents”). Regardless who is correct, loser pays is more effective 
if patent examiners are reviewing applications based on their merits rather than external 
considerations. 
 99. For example, the PTO recently noted in a publication, “In the Computers and 
Communication sector, which includes a large majority of the controversial software and 
business method patents, allowance rates are relatively lower (allowance rate of 49.8%).” 
Michael Carley, Deepak Hegde & Alan Marco, What Is the Probability of Receiving a US 
Patent? 8 (U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Working Paper No. 2, 2013), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2367149 [http://perma.cc/7RBZ-RZTL]. A lower allowance rate 
conforms with the general consensus that this sector contains more weak applications. 
That the PTO is rejecting more applications here suggests they are catching at least some 
of these weak ones. See also Zhen Lei & Brian D. Wright, Why Weak Patents? Are U.S. 
Examiners Ignorant of the Quality of the Patents They Grant? 1 (unpublished manuscript) 
(on file with author) (suggesting that PTO “examiners are by and large not ignorant of the 
quality of patents they issue” and measuring patent weakness by comparing parallel 
application outcomes at the PTO and European Patent Office). Still, such evidence is not 
dispositive and more research needs to be done to test the baseline assertion here. 
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and providing a more useful disclosure in their specification. 
This would in turn improve patent quality. 
Moreover, by disincentivizing weak patent applications 
from being filed, loser pays would stem the overall flow of 
patent applications. All else being equal, each PTO examiner 
would then have more time to review each patent application. 
If we think PTO examiners would do a better job of reviewing 
applications if they had more time per application, then loser 
pays helps move us in that direction. Hence, an ancillary 
benefit of loser pays is that it could improve the overall quality 
of patent examination, in addition to improving the overall 
quality of filed applications. 
B. Disincentivizing Continuations 
One potential limitation of the loser-pays systems described 
thus far is that while they might not encourage continuations, 
they do not actively discourage them either. This is because an 
applicant who receives a final rejection forfeits his fee, regardless 
what he does next. As such, his decision whether to file an RCE 
or appeal is not affected. 
We may instead want to discourage continuations on weak 
applications by reducing the recoverable bond amount as 
prosecution proceeds. Consider again the original example where 
the applicant pays a $10,000 bond upon filing. As before, if the 
applicant receives a notice of allowance, he receives his entire 
bond back, plus whatever reward is given to him. If the applicant 
receives a final rejection, however, the maximum amount he can 
recover is halved to $5,000. 
At this point, the applicant has a choice: file an RCE or an 
appeal, or abandon the application. If the applicant abandons, 
the $5,000 will be returned to him. If he files an RCE or an 
appeal and wins, he will also win back the $5,000. But if he 
files an RCE or appeal and fails, he will forfeit the entire 
$10,000, regardless what he chooses to do subsequently in 
prosecution. 
Such a system would disincentivize both bad 
applications and bad RCEs. The initial bond posting would 
discourage bad applicants from filing in the first place. And 
halving the initial bond amount after an applicant receives 
a rejection would disincentivize poorer quality applicants 
from filing an RCE. Although such an approach would be 
slightly more complicated to administer, it could reduce 
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weak filings as well as deter lengthy prosecutions of weak 
applications.100 
C. Prizes 
All of the above proposals support, in one way or another, fee 
refunds for successful applicants and fee forfeitures for 
unsuccessful ones. But a true loser-pays system takes things a 
step further: it provides prizes to successful patent applicants 
proportional to the fees that are forfeited by unsuccessful ones. 
Such a system has certain advantages. 
First, and most obviously, prizes increase the stakes in 
patent examination. By rewarding successful patent applicants 
and penalizing unsuccessful ones, loser pays provides applicants 
with extra incentives to be successful. And successful 
applications are more likely to be narrower, better drafted, and of 
higher quality. So prizes for good applications, in combination 
with penalties for bad ones, should increase the quality of patent 
applications and subsequent patents. 
Prizes also increase the potential returns for all applicants, 
and hence they might increase both strong and weak applicants’ 
incentives to file. Still, to the extent we believe that a weak 
application is on average more likely to be rejected than a strong 
one (a baseline assumption discussed earlier), we would expect 
prizes to incentivize stronger applications more than they 
incentivize weaker ones. Moreover, to the extent an applicant can 
control the quality of his application (i.e., he can raise the quality 
by more narrowly claiming a credible invention and improving 
his disclosure), we should expect that prizes would generally 
increase application quality across the board. 
Prizes are also an easy way for the PTO to implement fee 
forfeiture without biasing its incentives during application 
                                            
 100.  Of course, not all RCEs or appeals are bad; sometimes a continuation or appeal 
might lead the PTO to accept an application it had improperly rejected. This is a social 
good, at least to the extent we think patents incentivize invention.  
  Still in many situations, RCEs and appeals will impose more social costs than 
benefits. For example, an RCE might lead to more PTO errors, if the agency caves to 
insistent applicants and approves filings it had properly rejected at first. And regardless 
of outcome, RCEs and appeals always generate extra transaction costs.  
  The partial bond approach described here allows the PTO to balance these social 
benefits and costs. If RCEs tend to be socially beneficial (which will be more likely if most 
applications are good and if chances are high the PTO will correct an improper rejection 
in an RCE), the PTO should decrease the fees an applicant loses if she unsuccessfully 
pursues an RCE. If RCEs tend to be socially wasteful (which will be more likely if they 
generate high transaction costs and if chances are high an RCE will lead to either more 
errors or the same outcome), then the PTO should increase the fees at risk for applicants 
who pursue RCEs. 
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review. As noted previously, unlike most agencies, the PTO runs 
on user fees. If the PTO receives additional fees when it issues 
final rejections—as would be the case if it implemented fee 
forfeiture—then we might be concerned that the PTO would 
issue such rejections more frequently, not on the merits but 
because it is in the agency’s economic interest to do so.101 
If loser pays is implemented with prizes, however, this 
should not be a problem. In a true loser-pays scheme, the costs 
paid by the losers are received by the winners. Hence, any 
additional revenue that is received by the PTO through 
loser-pays penalties would be returned to successful 
applicants.102 This system is thus revenue neutral by design, and 
PTO incentives are not altered.103 
Prizes also give the PTO additional flexibility in pursuing 
various policy objectives, since they could be implemented in a 
number of different ways. Most basically, the PTO could set 
prizes based on the average number of “winner” and “loser” 
applicants. For example, the PTO has recently suggested that 
47.5% of progenitor applications (those unrelated to any 
previously filed application) received a notice of allowance but no 
final rejection.104 Since about one-half of the applicants here are 
                                            
 101. This might not just be a hypothetical concern. Recent research by Michael 
Frakes and Melissa Wasserman suggests the PTO responds to financial incentives in its 
granting behavior. See generally Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Does 
Agency Funding Affect Decisionmaking?: An Empirical Assessment of the PTO’s Granting 
Patterns, 66 VAND. L. REV. 67, 79–80, 82 (2013). Regardless, it’s possible that we want the 
PTO to issue more final rejections as a policy matter. But if so, that should be the stated 
policy objective and not an inadvertent effect of adopting a fee forfeiture scheme. 
 102. Conceivably, the PTO could instead spend the money on other policy objectives, 
so long as these objectives do not directly benefit the agency (and hence the PTO’s 
incentives remain unaltered). Alternatively, any extra PTO fees could be siphoned off by 
Congress and appropriated elsewhere in a process known as fee diversion. See id. at  
76–78. Still, we might be concerned that such programs would provide some indirect 
benefits to agency officials that would lead to a bias in favor of rejection. Id. at 109–10. 
Instead, a loser-pays system with prizes could be revenue-neutral by design and avoid 
this potential problem. 
 103. Current law might require the PTO to return money collected from forfeited 
bonds anyway. See Leahy–Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 10, 125 Stat. 
316 (2011). Even though the PTO now has limited control over its fees, it is not supposed 
to charge fees merely to increase its revenues and gain profit. Instead, it is instructed to 
“set or adjust by rule any fee” in order “to recover the aggregate estimated costs to the 
Office for processing, activities, services, and materials relating to patents.” Id. Collecting 
forfeited bonds and not returning them to applicants in the form of prizes would arguably 
run afoul of this directive. 
 104. See Carley et al., supra note 99, at 4. This percentage is the sum of the 
percentage of applications approved on a first office action (11.4%), and the 
percentage who received a non-final rejection and a notice of allowance, but no final 
rejection (36.1%). Out of the remaining applications, 2.3% were abandoned before a 
first action, 14.5% were abandoned between receiving a non-final and final rejection, 
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“winners,” that suggests setting a prize equal to the bond 
amount—so if losers pay $10,000, winners will receive $10,000.  
Indeed, a nice feature of loser pays is that the prize amount 
naturally depends on the number of loser applications that are 
received. For example, as the quality of applications improves in 
a loser-pays system, the reward decreases. To illustrate, suppose 
that after loser pays is instituted, application quality increases, 
and now two-thirds of applicants receive a notice of allowance 
before a final rejection. In such a system, the reward would 
decrease to $5,000.105 
Note there are countless other possible permutations. For 
example, instead of having a variable prize, one could have a 
fixed amount for the prize and a variable amount for the penalty. 
Or the PTO could conduct these same calculations on an 
industry-specific basis, based on the proportion of losers and 
winners in a particular technology category. The point is that 
prizes give the PTO substantial flexibility in implementing a 
loser-pays regime, while remaining revenue-neutral overall. 
D. AIA, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and Pilot Fee Program 
 To what extent could the PTO implement loser pays in 
patent examination under current law? As noted, the America 
Invents Act (AIA) empowered the PTO to set any patent fees 
such that it recovers its “aggregate estimated costs.”106 In other 
words, the PTO should be revenue-neutral; it should not set fees 
and gain profits like a revenue-maximizing monopolist.107 Still, 
the statute appears to implicitly empower the PTO to subsidize 
certain activities and penalize others, so long as total fees match 
total costs.108 
Indeed, the PTO has already taken advantage of this fiscal 
freedom. When exercising its new fee setting authority for the 
                                            
and 38.7% received a final rejection. Id. The data were drawn from 1996–2005 filing 
cohorts. Id. 
 105. Now, for every three applicants, one is a “loser” and two are “winners.” So the 
$10,000 paid by the one loser applicant is split among the two winners, with each 
receiving a $5,000 prize. 
 106. Leahy–Smith America Invents Act § 10 (instructing the PTO to “set or adjust by 
rule any fee” in order “to recover the aggregate estimated costs to the Office for 
processing, activities, services, and materials relating to patents”); see supra notes 48, 102 
and accompanying text. 
 107. For more discussion on the PTO’s fee setting authority under the AIA, see 
Sukhatme, supra note 65, at 1913–16. 
 108. See supra note 103 and accompanying text (describing how the PTO only 
recovers fees to cover administrative costs); infra note 119 and accompanying text 
(describing how individuals and some small entities qualify for subsidies, which include 
patent applications fees). 
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first time in 2013, the PTO stated that it was setting front-end 
fees below their actual costs “[t]o encourage innovators to take 
advantage of patent protection.”109 Since these lower front-end 
fees must be covered by higher back-end fees, the PTO is 
implicitly deciding to tax successful patentees in order to 
subsidize applicant access to the patent office. 
Implementing a loser-pays system would also seem to be 
within the PTO’s power under the AIA. A system in which 
penalties from patent losers are redistributed to patent winners, 
after first covering PTO expenses, is revenue-neutral. The PTO 
need not retain any additional fees under a loser-pays system 
than under the current fee system, thereby complying with the 
letter of the AIA. 
Indeed, one could credibly argue that the agency might 
actually be mandated to follow a loser-pays approach. This is 
because, as an executive branch agency within the Department of 
Commerce, the PTO must follow executive orders mandating 
cost-benefit analysis when it promulgates “economically 
significant” regulations.110 As Jonathan Masur has recently 
argued, when exercising its fee-setting authority, the PTO must 
consider both the social benefits and social costs of fee changes.111 
For example, it should quantify the effect of fee changes on 
patent benefits (such as dynamic incentives to invent) and patent 
costs (such as costs due to patent thickets, deadweight loss 
caused by monopoly pricing, and administrative costs of the 
patent system).112 
So would a loser-pays system fare better under cost-benefit 
analysis than the current fee structure? Very likely the answer is 
“yes,” though a thorough empirical investigation is needed to 
know for sure. To begin, loser pays will almost certainly lower 
social costs associated with patents. By reducing the number of 
weak patents, loser pays will reduce the potential for patent 
assertion entities to exploit weak patents to hold up companies 
and thereby tax real innovation. It will also reduce the 
contribution of weak patents to patent thickets and lead to 
patents with narrower and clearer claims, providing more notice 
                                            
 109. Setting and Adjusting Patent Fees, 78 Fed. Reg. 4211, 4216 (Jan. 18, 2013). 
 110. See Jonathan S. Masur, CBA at the PTO, 65 DUKE L.J. 1701, 1702, 1706 (2016). 
President Reagan first introduced cost-benefit analysis via executive order in 1981, and 
every president since then has kept that mandate in place. Id. at 1702 (first citing Exec. 
Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. § 127 (1982); then citing Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 
§ 638 (1994) (Clinton); and then citing Exec. Order No. 13,563, 3 C.F.R. § 215 (2012) 
(Obama)). 
 111. See generally id. 
 112. See id. at 1724–25. 
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to potential infringers and other innovators. Relatedly, by 
reducing the number of weak patents, loser pays will lessen 
whatever deadweight loss these patents cause. 
More directly, loser pays will lower PTO administrative 
review costs by deterring weak applications from being filed in 
the first place, and by improving the quality of the applications 
that are filed. It may even lower future patent litigation costs, to 
the extent that weak patents are litigated. 
Second, loser pays seems unlikely to harm dynamic 
incentives to invent. By lowering the cost for “winner” 
applications (through fee reductions and prizes), loser pays is 
subsidizing and thereby encouraging inventions that, on average, 
are likely to be more welfare-enhancing. It accomplishes this by 
raising expenses for “loser” applications, but such inventions are 
on average likely to be of lower social value.113 Both of these 
effects are not so trivial to estimate; still, at first glance, loser 
pays seems promising in terms of its effect on innovation 
incentives.114 
Even if one disagrees that the PTO has the power or 
obligation to implement loser pays, the agency could implement a 
more conservative approach that would certainly not require any 
congressional authorization: a voluntary pilot program that 
allows applicants to opt into loser pays. When filing a patent 
application electronically (as most applicants do), the PTO could 
ask applicants whether they want to be in the “normal” filing 
program or a loser-pays pilot program. Examination of an 
application would otherwise proceed in exactly the same way 
under either program.115 Although the system could be 
implemented in a number of different ways, a simple approach 
would be to limit the pilot program to a fee refund, without an 
additional prize component. So participants who opt into loser 
                                            
 113. See Masur, supra note 8, at 687 (explaining how patent fees screen out 
inventions that produce lower, rather than higher, social welfare). 
 114. In analyzing this Article’s loser-pays proposal, Lisa Ouellette recently suggested 
the PTO already had the power, and perhaps even some sort of obligation, to impose loser 
pays. She further commented, “If the PTO’s current fee structure were compared with 
Sukhatme’s [loser-pays proposal] under a correct application of CBA, I think Sukhatme’s 
would win.” See Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Neel Sukhatme: Make Patent Examination 
Losers Pay, WRITTEN DESCRIPTION (July 13, 2016), http://writtendescription 
.blogspot.com/2016/07/neel-sukhatme-make-patent-examination.html [http://perma.cc/734 
D-HJAB]. 
 115. The PTO would hide from its examiners information on what program an 
applicant has selected (and prohibit applicants from disclosing this information in 
communications with their examiner). Hence, examiners would not be influenced by the 
applicant’s decision, and the only effect of choosing loser pays would be on the fees the 
applicant pays and the prizes she might be awarded. 
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pays will pay higher front-end fees but receive a full refund if 
they obtain a notice of allowance before getting a final rejection. 
Would applicants actually opt into the pilot fee program? 
That would likely depend on how much higher the front-end fees 
for the pilot program are relative to standard front-end fees. 
Regardless, one would expect that higher-quality patent 
applicants would be more likely to select the loser-pays program, 
since they are more likely to believe they will win back their fees. 
Additionally, one might view opting into loser pays as a positive 
signal during subsequent litigation—an applicant who chooses 
loser pays is sufficiently confident that their invention was 
patentable that they selected the riskier (but potentially more 
rewarding) loser-pays path.116 
VI. POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS AND REFINEMENTS 
Having laid out how loser pays could be implemented in 
patent examination, the present section addresses potential 
pitfalls to avoid, as well as a number of refinements. 
A. Risk Aversion and Fairness Concerns 
One might be concerned that loser pays might disincentivize 
some resource-constrained or risk-averse inventors from applying 
for a patent. Or put differently, if we increase the fees on losing 
applicants, perhaps we are biasing the system against the 
individual inventor, who is less able to pay such fees if he loses. 
This is an important concern, but one that need not be 
problematic in practice if properly addressed. First, note that 
loser pays disproportionately deters weak applications rather 
than strong ones. Although some good applications might be 
deterred, it seems unlikely that most worthwhile innovations 
would be foregone by a relatively modest bond increase.117 
Moreover, we should not be troubled if a risk-averse applicant 
                                            
 116. Ideally, the pilot program described here would be designed as a proper field 
experiment that uses randomization to permit inferences about the effect of loser pays on 
application quality. See generally Glenn W. Harrison & John A. List, Field Experiments, 
42 J. ECON LIT. 1009 (2004). One way to do this would be to take all applicants who opt 
into the loser-pays system and randomly assign them into a treatment group (that enters 
the loser-pays system) or a control group (that is fed back into the standard-fee system). 
One could then examine various metrics of patent quality to see the effect of the 
loser-pays program on the two groups. 
 117. Moreover, the presence of prizes will disproportionately incentivize good 
applicants, which reduces the need for excessively high fee forfeitures in a loser-pays 
system. See supra Section V.C (explaining how prizes give the PTO flexibility in 
implementing various policy objectives, as they can be implemented in a variety of 
different ways). 
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eschews patent protection due to loser pays but nonetheless 
decides to create and commercialize the invention. Patents are 
not needed to incentivize these kinds of “inevitable” inventions, 
so these inventions do not need patent protection.118 
In any event, the PTO has already instituted discounted fees 
for small and micro inventors as a way to address potential 
concerns about patent fees deterring resource-constrained or 
risk-averse inventors.119 Small entities pay one-half of standard 
PTO fees, and micro entities pay just one-quarter of standard 
fees. The PTO could apply these rules in the bond context, where 
small and micro entities would have their upfront bond amounts 
halved and quartered, respectively.120 
Still, others might question more generally whether a fee 
forfeiture regime is fair. For example, suppose the examiner 
makes a mistake and improperly rejects the application. Later 
the applicant gets the mistake reversed on appeal or during an 
RCE and successfully obtains the patent. Why shouldn’t this 
applicant get back his full bond?121 
To begin, note that even under the current system, if an 
examiner errs and improperly issues a final rejection, an 
applicant will generally need to pursue an RCE or an appeal in 
order to correct the error. The fees expended for these 
proceedings are not refundable. So examiners’ mistakes costs 
applicants money even today. 
In the aggregate, loser pays actually improves on this current 
dynamic. Although some good applicants may be “undeserved 
losers” in any one particular case, those good applicants on average 
should fare better under loser pays because they will win more often 
than they lose and hence collect more prizes than fees.122 Put 
                                            
 118. See generally Devlin & Sukhatme, supra note 20 (arguing that patents should 
be awarded only to the extent necessary to incentivize invention); see also Olson, supra 
note 20, at 195, 203 (explaining how patent grants can be inefficient in incentivizing 
invention in certain subject matter areas). 
 119. Individuals, small businesses, or nonprofits can qualify as small entities. See 37 
C.F.R. § 1.27 (2015) (defining “small entities”). A subset of these (including inventors who 
have filed fewer than four previous patent applications and whose previous year’s gross 
income was less than three times of median household income) can qualify for micro 
entity status. See 35 U.S.C. § 123(a)–(c) (2012) (defining “micro entity”). 
 120. See 35 U.S.C. § 41(h) (2012) (providing a 50% fee reduction for small entities); 
Leahy–Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 10(b), 125 Stat. 284, 316–17 
(2011) (specifying a 75% fee reduction for micro entities). 
 121. A related concern is that some examiners might be more lenient than others. 
Some applicants, therefore, will get unlucky and draw a tougher examiner, which, on the 
margin, will affect their likelihood of obtaining patent protection. 
 122. In a larger sense, society will benefit on average from a loser-pays rule because it 
will lead to higher quality patents—ones that actually incentivize innovation and are not weak. 
Given that utilitarianism is the guiding principle behind patents themselves, this 
Do Not Delete  9/29/2016  11:59 AM 
2016] “LOSER PAYS” IN PATENT EXAMINATION 199 
differently, by providing patent winners with a reward (even if that 
reward is merely a fee refund), we lower in expectation what their 
fees are when they file a patent application. That incentivizes 
applicants who repeatedly file “good” applications, particularly if 
they are price-sensitive.123 
 At any rate, the PTO can always temper the proposed 
system to decrease the number of undeserved losers. First, 
instead of forfeiting an applicant’s bond when she receives a final 
rejection, the PTO might allow her one RCE or appeal. At the end 
of that process, if the applicant still does not receive a notice of 
allowance, she forfeits the bond. This more conservative 
approach would give these applicants one more bite at the apple 
before fee forfeiture occurs.124 
Second, the PTO could exempt some applicants from a 
loser-pays system unless they affirmatively “opt in.” Such an 
approach might make sense for certain applicants who might have 
more difficulty assessing their application quality ex ante. For 
example, one such group of applicants might be pro se applicants.125 
Since these applicants do not have the benefit of a patent attorney 
or agent to prepare and review their patent application, they might 
be less able to assess their application quality ex ante (and also less 
likely to be aware of the nuances of a loser-pays system).126 
                                            
consideration is what should primarily guide policy. See generally Devlin & Sukhatme, supra 
note 20 (explaining the utilitarian basis for patent law); see also Olson, supra note 20, at 183, 
192, 203 (applying a utilitarian perspective to the public goods problem). 
 123. A loser-pays system also does not shut out undeserved losers altogether, as they 
can still continue prosecution (albeit at higher overall cost than under the current 
system). And as noted previously, any additional fees that resource-constrained 
applicants will be asked to pay is tempered by the fact that they would be eligible for 
small or micro entity fees. See supra notes 119–20 and accompanying text. 
 124. The PTO already moved in a similar direction in 2013, when it instituted higher 
fees for second or subsequent RCEs relative to fees for first RCEs. See Setting and 
Adjusting Patent Fees, 78 Fed. Reg. 4212, 4224 (Jan. 18, 2013). In setting this final rule, 
the PTO also noted that “around 70 percent of RCE applications filed in a year are for 
first RCEs and the remaining 30 percent are for a second or subsequent RCE. Given this 
data, it is reasonable to expect that most outstanding issues are resolved with the first 
RCE.” Setting and Adjusting Patent Fees, 78 Fed. Reg. at 4229. 
 125. Pro se applicants likely make up a small percentage of total applicants. For example, 
I previously found that out of approximately 517,510 issued patents between 1994 and 1998, 
only 23,852 (or 4.61%) were prosecuted by pro se applicants. See generally Neel U. Sukhatme 
& Judd N.L. Cramer, Who Cares About Patent Term? Cross-Industry Differences in Term 
Sensitivity 8–12 (Princeton Univ. Dep’t of Econ., Working Paper, 2014), 
https://irs.princeton.edu/sites/irs/files/event/uploads/Sukhatme,%20Who%20Cares%20About%
20Patent%20Term.pdf [http://perma.cc/X3EE-JTTT] (describing the dataset used to calculate 
the preceding statistic). Of course, pro se applications likely make up a larger percentage of 
total patent applications that are filed (since their applications seem more likely to be rejected). 
 126. Still, even these applicants might be incentivized by loser pays toward filing 
stronger applications in the first place. Even if an applicant is uninformed, so long as 
he knows he is uninformed, there are concrete steps he can take to improve his 
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Similarly, the PTO might want to exclude from loser pays 
less experienced patent applicants. These might include, for 
example, those who have prosecuted fewer than four patent 
applications and qualify for micro-entity status. Like pro se 
applicants, “less experienced” applicants might be excluded from 
loser pays unless they affirmatively opt in to the system.127 
B. Prior Art Concerns 
Somewhat relatedly, one might be concerned that loser pays 
would be unfair to those who are unaware of certain relevant 
prior art, particularly obscure printed publications that describe 
the claimed invention.128 Since loser pays raises the stakes of 
patent examination, one might be concerned that it punishes 
those individuals who have neither the resources nor the ability 
to seek out this kind of prior art before filing their application. 
Again, this concern can be readily addressed. As a 
preliminary matter, note that not just any printed publication 
can count as prior art. Rather, only references that are “public[ly] 
accessib[le]” constitute printed publications for purposes of prior 
art.129 So it is a limited subset of printed publications that might 
prove problematic here. 
More importantly, the PTO typically does not rely on printed 
publications to reject patent applications. Rather, it rejects 
applications primarily based on prior U.S. patents and published 
U.S. patent applications.130 One recent empirical article found 
                                            
patent filings. For example, he can look at relevant prior art to see whether the 
asserted invention is actually novel. Most prior art that’s likely to be cited by an 
examiner is readily accessible online via the PTO website or Google Patents. See 
infra Section VI.B (addressing concerns under loser pays when invalidating prior art 
cited by the examiner is so obscure that it is unlikely to have been found by the 
average applicant). Second, even an uninformed applicant can write more targeted 
patent claims with a more realistic scope. This involves adding limitations to claims 
to curtail excessive breadth. 
 127. Alternatively, one could structure the system as an “opt out” system—that is, 
pro se or inexperienced applicants would be presumed to select into loser pays unless they 
opt out. Research on the difference between “opt in” and “opt out” systems suggests the 
former is likely to be more protective of applicants and hence a better choice if one is 
concerned about the effect of loser pays on such applicants. See, e.g., Richard H. Thaler & 
Shlomo Bernartzi, Save More Tomorrow™: Using Behavioral Economics to Increase 
Employee Saving, 112 J. POL. ECON. S164 (2004) (concluding that an “opt-in” employee 
savings plan is more successful at getting people to save). 
 128. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) (2012) (“A person shall be entitled to a patent 
unless . . . (1) the claimed invention was patented, described in a printed publication, or in 
public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the public before the effective filing date of 
the claimed invention”). 
 129. See In re Hall, 781 F.2d 897, 898–99 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
 130. See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 1, at 318 (“Persistent commentary also reports 
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that in a 1% random sample of all utility patents issued in 2007, 
patents and published patent applications made up 64% of all 
cited prior art, and examiners accounted for only 6% of all cited 
non-patent art and foreign patents.131 
Given that patents and prior published applications are 
easily accessible and searchable on the USPTO website and on 
Google, it is reasonable to presume that most applicants can find 
relevant prior art in these categories.132 Similarly, given that 
many foreign patents—often granted by the European Patent 
Office or the Japan Patent Office—are also searchable online, it 
makes sense to presume that applicants can find these references 
too, at least to the extent they are available in English. 
In the relatively rare case in which an examiner rejects an 
application based on a written publication that the examiner 
herself found, the PTO could suspend the loser-pays rule and 
treat the applicant as if she had applied under a standard fee 
regime. In other words, loser pays might be reserved only for 
situations where the PTO issues final rejections based on patents 
or published patent applications, or applicant-submitted prior 
art. 
C. Why Not Just Raise Patent Fees? 
One might argue for a simpler approach—why not just raise 
patent fees, without instituting loser pays? Natural candidates 
for such fee increases include RCE fees and front-end patent fees 
(i.e., filing, search and examination fees). While merely raising 
these fees might be a bit simpler and has some merit,133 such 
approaches would also be less effective in deterring weak 
applications as compared to loser pays. 
First, consider raising RCE fees. Higher fees would deter 
continuations and they would disproportionately affect weak 
                                            
that the Patent Office has increasingly relied upon previously issued patents as prior art.” 
(citing Wayne M. Kennard, Software Patents as a Weapon: Are You Ready to Rumble?, in 
19TH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON COMPUTER LAW 1123, 1135 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, 
Trademarks & Literary Prop. Course Handbook Series No. 547, 1999))). 
 131. See Christopher A. Cotropia, Mark A. Lemley & Bhaven Sampat, Do Applicant 
Citations Matter?, 42 RES. POL’Y 844, 846 (2013). 
 132. Scuttling a patent with obscure publications is more likely in patent litigation, 
where a defendant has both the means and incentive to find such references. See Doug 
Lichtman & Mark A. Lemley, Rethinking Patent Law’s Presumption of Validity, 60 STAN. 
L. REV. 45, 66 (2007). To the extent one is troubled with this phenomenon, it reflects a 
deeper problem with the patent system that has nothing to do with loser pays. 
 133. As Jonathan Masur has noted, raising patent fees would deter weak 
applications, but it would deter some non-weak ones as well, though likely to a lesser 
extent than bad ones. See Masur, supra note 8, at 710–12 (explaining how patent fees 
disproportionately screen out patents with lower social value). 
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applications, which are more likely to require continuations. But 
they would not directly deter the filing of weak applications in the 
first place. Put differently, a weak applicant would still get a chance 
at sneaking an application by an examiner in his initial prosecution. 
Only if this gambit fails would the applicant be forced to decide 
whether to file an RCE. As such, heightened RCE fees would not 
effectively deter weak application filings in the first instance.134 
A more promising approach is to raise front-end fees, which 
would deter some weak applications from being filed. Still, such 
an approach would also be less effective than a loser-pays regime. 
This is because of the way loser pays magnifies differences 
between patent winners and losers. 
To see this, consider our current winner pays system. If 
front-end patent fees are increased substantially, then both 
patent winners and patent losers will pay more for access to the 
patent system. Patent losers will have greater losses; patent 
winners will have smaller gains. The increased fees will deter 
some applicants from filing patent applications, and these are 
more likely to be applicants with relatively low-value 
inventions.135 To the extent we believe these patents are weak 
and would only issue when the patent office makes an error, this 
filtering mechanism is socially beneficial, as it prevents these 
applications from being filed in the first place. 
But there is a second way in which weak patent applications 
could be reduced: incentivize those individuals who do file 
applications to file higher quality ones. Inventors might improve 
application quality in a number of ways, such as by clarifying the 
invention description, better familiarizing themselves pre-filing 
with the relevant prior art, and perhaps most importantly, 
drafting narrower patent claims that do not read on the prior art. 
Merely increasing front-end fees might incentivize such 
improvements, but it would do so less effectively than loser pays. 
The reason for this is that merely increasing fees does not change 
the “wedge” between patent winners and patent losers; that is, it 
does not change the incremental dollar amount that winners receive 
over losers. 
A formal model is beyond the scope of the present discussion, 
but higher front-end fees on their own will not induce 
                                            
 134. This result also holds for more extreme approaches that ban continuations 
altogether (or perhaps ban second or subsequent continuations). Note that such 
approaches are akin to raising continuation fees to infinity. 
 135. We should not be troubled that such applications are deterred by higher fees, 
since these low private value inventions also likely have low social value. See Masur, 
supra note 8, at 710–12. 
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risk-neutral patent applicants—which might include many 
corporate or repeat applicants—to take extra care when drafting 
applications they file. This is because both the upside gains from 
obtaining a patent, and the downside losses if no patent is 
obtained, are shifted by the same dollar amount. From the 
perspective of risk-neutral applicants, nothing has changed in 
terms of optimizing their applications, so they will draft their 
applications the same way under either fee regime. 
By contrast, loser pays will induce risk-neutral applicants to 
file higher quality applications. As noted, this is because loser 
pays increases the returns for filing a winning patent application 
relative to a losing one. Hence, it will encourage applicants to file 
better (generally narrower) applications, thereby increasing their 
chances of being approved. 
The dynamic is a bit more complicated for risk-averse 
applicants but economic theory suggests a similar result: higher 
front-end fees may improve application quality, but loser pays 
will produce even greater improvements. To see why, first note 
that risk-averse applicants do not perceive equal dollar changes 
to their upside and downside equally. Due to their risk aversion, 
raising fees by a set amount across the board decreases an 
applicant’s utility more when her application fails than when it 
succeeds. For example, a $500 fee increase “hurts” an applicant 
more when her application is rejected than when it is approved. 
As such, heightened front-end fees raise the relative cost of 
patent rejection, thereby encouraging applicants to avoid 
rejection by improving their application quality, such as by filing 
narrower patent claims. 
But loser pays achieves an even stronger result for risk-averse 
applicants. Again, this is because loser pays increases the wedge 
between patent winners and losers. Put differently, raising fees 
across the board is a “stick” that penalizes both patent losers and 
patent winners, though risk-averse losers feel the pain a bit more. 
By contrast, loser pays only applies the stick to patent losers, and 
instead provides a “carrot” (a fee reduction or prize) for patent 
winners. Putting the carrot and stick together encourages 
risk-averse applicants to file higher quality applications than would 
be achieved by raising front-end fees across the board. 
Finally, as a practical matter, relying solely on front-end fees 
to deter weak applications might require a huge increase, which 
might have unintended bad consequences.136 Instead, the PTO 
                                            
 136. See, e.g., Wagner, supra note 21, at 2172 (noting that “more radical approaches” 
to improving patent quality include “limit[ing] patenting to 100,000 filings per year” or 
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can improve application quality with smaller increases to 
front-end fees using loser-pays regime than if it relies on 
front-end fee increases alone. As such, loser pays can deter weak 
applications while staying true to the patent system’s 
long-standing policy of setting low front-end fees to keep the 
system relatively affordable and accessible to all.137 
D. Sensitivity to Application Fees 
In order for loser pays to have any bite, applicants must be 
sensitive to changes in patent application fees. In other words, patent 
fees must be high enough such that applicants actually change their 
behavior in response to fee changes. Some might be concerned that 
applicants might not respond to a loser-pays scheme if, for example, 
the underlying patent fees or prizes pale in comparison to the cost of 
hiring a patent attorney or agent to prosecute an application. 
While this concern might have some merit, it is unlikely to 
be problematic in practice. First, empirical evidence suggests 
that applicants do, in fact, respond to relatively small changes in 
patent fees. For example, Gaétan de Rassenfosse and Adam Jaffe 
recently analyzed the effect of the Patent Law Amendment Act of 
1982, which substantially increased fees from filing to grant 
(from approximately $239 to $800) and introduced maintenance 
fees ($400, $800, and $1,200, at 3.5, 7.5, and 11.5 years, 
respectively).138 Using a difference-in-differences methodology 
and various measures of patent quality, they estimated that fees 
disincentivized the filing of low quality patents—specifically, the 
fees filtered out 16%–17% of patents in the lowest quality decile 
and 24%–30% of patents in the lowest quality quintile.139 
                                            
“rais[ing] direct costs ten-fold” but that such approaches would “also have serious (and 
probably negative) effects on the basic incentive structure of the patent system—effects 
large enough to swamp any losses from low quality patents”). 
 137. See supra text accompanying note 63. 
 138. See Gaétan de Rassenfosse & Adam Jaffe, Are Patent Fees Effective at Weeding Out 
Low Quality Patents? 6 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 20785 2014), 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w20785 [http://perma.cc/AK6M-SDJG]; see also Gaétan de 
Rassenfosse & Bruno van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, On the Price Elasticity of Demand for 
Patents, 74 OXFORD BUL. ECON. & STAT. 58, 66 (2012) (using fee increases to estimate price 
elasticities); U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, USPTO SECTION 10 FEE SETTING—
DESCRIPTION OF ELASTICITY ESTIMATES 10–12 (2013) [hereinafter USPTO SECTION 10 FEE 
SETTING], http://www.uspto.gov/aia_implementation/aia_section_10_elasticity_supplement.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/GL75-FHNJ] (estimating of price elasticity of demand for changes in user fees). 
 139. Rassenfosse & Jaffe, supra note 138, at 4. The quality measures the authors used 
were the number of citations a patent receives (average decreased after the fee increase), the 
number of claims (average increased), the family size—i.e., number of jurisdictions in which a 
patent application was filed (average increased), and the number of times a patent is renewed 
(average increased). Id. at 8–9. Some might disagree with these measures, but that they all 
responded to the fee change in the predicted direction gives some support for the proposition 
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These results suggest that changes in fees can impact 
applicant behavior, particularly by disincentivizing weaker 
patent applications.140 As this Article has argued, there are good 
reasons founded in economics that suggest loser pays will be even 
more effective than simple fee increases in disincentivizing weak 
applications.141 
Moreover, if the PTO implements loser pays and observes 
that applicants are not sufficiently changing their behavior—for 
example, the quality of filed applications does not improve—it 
always has the option of further increasing front-end fees and/or 
patent prizes, to increase the wedge between patent winners and 
losers. At some point, fees will undoubtedly have an effect as 
hypothesized here and suggested by the empirical evidence: that 
is, they will disincentivize weak patent applications and improve 
the quality of those applications that are filed. 
E. Claim or Application Level 
Another wrinkle to consider is whether loser pays should be 
implemented at the patent claim level or the patent application 
level. A patent application generally has multiple claims, each of 
which technically covers a separate invention and is considered 
separately by the patent examiner. So if some claims are 
allowable but others are rejected, is an applicant a patent 
“winner” or “loser?”142 
If loser pays is implemented at the claim level, then a bond 
would be posted for each claim; applicants would receive rewards 
for good claims and forfeit their bonds on bad ones.143 Although a 
claim-based approach might be workable, it would likely water 
down the stakes and reduce the benefits of loser pays. 
To see why, consider an applicant with twenty claims, 
nineteen of which are good and one of which is weak. If loser 
pays is implemented on a per-claim level, this applicant has 
                                            
that heightened fees disproportionately discouraged weak applications. 
 140. The fact that patentees, including large corporations, often decide not to renew 
patents rather than pay maintenance fees suggests that patentees’ behavior is shaped at 
least in part by patent fees. See Sukhatme, supra note 65, at tbl.1 app. (showing 
percentage of patents maintained in different invention subcategories); see also USPTO 
SECTION 10 FEE SETTING, supra note 138, at 10–11, 12 tbl.1. 
 141. See supra section VI.C. 
 142. The PTO will not send a notice of allowance unless all pending claims are 
accepted. See generally MPEP, § 607.02 (9th ed. Rev. 7, Nov. 2015). However, an 
examiner may indicate in a final office action that some claims are allowable, and that a 
notice of allowance would be in order if any pending rejected claims are canceled. Id. 
 143. Stephen Yelderman proposed bond forfeiture when applicants amend or cancel 
claims. See Yelderman, supra note 8, at 120–21. 
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little incentive to amend or cancel that last claim to avoid a 
final rejection, since the penalty is likely to be minimal for just 
one claim (especially if she is rewarded for the nineteen other 
good claims). Accordingly, the applicant has little incentive ex 
ante to avoid putting that one claim in the application in the 
first place, or to halt prosecution on that claim after it has 
been filed. 
On the other hand, if loser pays is an all-or-nothing 
proposition—either all of your claims are accepted before a final 
office action or else you forfeit your bond—then the applicant has 
a much stronger incentive to cancel or amend weak claims during 
prosecution, and to avoid filing them in the first place. This 
approach raises the stakes by labeling an application a patent 
winner only if it receives a notice of allowance, with all pending 
claims allowable. 
Accordingly, to maximize the deterrent effect of loser pays on 
weak applications, it should be implemented at the patent 
application level. Only if all pending claims are allowable should 
an applicant be deemed a patent winner; otherwise, he should be 
subject to fee forfeiture. 
F. Post-Grant Proceedings 
Finally, some might contend it is preferable to address weak 
patents through post-grant proceedings, whether in traditional 
patent litigation or through inter partes proceedings before the 
newly-created Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB). In 
particular, since most patents are never litigated or licensed, one 
might wonder why we should devote any resources ex ante to 
making sure that patent applications are of higher quality.144 
While this argument has some merit for approaches that 
require devoting more resources to improving PTO examination 
quality, it has much less force when applied to patent applicant 
behavior. The advantage of a loser-pays system is that it induces 
applicants to file better patent applications from the outset. It 
achieves this goal without requiring any additional PTO 
expenditures, since the mere prospect of heightened fees for 
patent losers and lower fees or prizes for winners is enough to 
induce better applications. 
More importantly, there are significant disadvantages to 
relying primarily on post-grant proceedings to deter weak 
patents. As Polk Wagner has noted, the penalty that a patent 
                                            
 144. See Lemley, supra note 34, at 1496, 1509–10. 
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will be invalidated in subsequent litigation is “woefully 
inadequate to deter low-quality filing behavior: its application is 
probabilistic, and the simple elimination of the low-quality 
patent is an insufficient cost to the holding patentee to deter 
strategic portfolio behavior.”145 And even if one imposes fines 
against patentees whose patents are invalidated in litigation, 
applicants will highly discount these fines since the prospect of 
litigation is so remote, both in terms of likelihood and 
temporally.146 So these fines will have little impact on ex ante 
application quality.147 
Additionally, even if weak patents are subsequently identified 
and eliminated in post-grant proceedings, there are costs associated 
with the uncertainty associated with the patent validity in the 
meantime.148 One can conceptualize this uncertainty as a tax that 
makes patent-related business decisions, such as whether to sell or 
license a technology, more costly.149 Loser pays greatly decreases 
this uncertainty by improving the overall quality of filed 
applications and granted patents. 
VII. CONCLUSION: FIXING THE PRICING OF PATENTS 
The best way to prevent weak patents is to deter weak 
patent applications. In our current system, successful patent 
applicants pay more than unsuccessful ones. As the present 
Article has shown, this makes little sense from an economic or 
policy-making standpoint. 
Rather, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office should import 
loser-pays principles into patent examination. Doing so would 
reduce the number of poor quality applications and hence the 
workload of PTO examiners, which in turn would likely improve 
their quality of review. Loser pays in patent examination would 
                                            
 145. See Wagner, supra note 21, at 2170. 
 146. See Sukhatme, supra note 65, at 1884–86. 
 147. Fines in PTAB proceedings may be more effective, since such proceedings are 
intended to move quickly and appear to be growing in popularity. See, e.g., Yasser 
El-Gamal, Ehab M. Samuel & Peter D. Siddoway, The New Battlefield: One Year of Inter 
Partes Review Under the America Invents Act, 42 AIPLA Q. J. 39 (2014). Still, it is hard 
to believe that a fine in a post-grant proceeding would ever be as effective as an 
equivalent fine in a loser-pays system in deterring weak applications from the outset. 
 148. See Wagner, supra note 21, at 2140 (“[A] patent system characterized by low 
patent quality sows substantial uncertainty at all levels of the patent system: uncertainty 
about the validity of granted patents, uncertainty about the scope of granted patents, 
uncertainty about whether a particular invention is patentable, and uncertainty about 
whether a valid patent will be fully enforced.”). 
 149. See id. More generally, to the extent that patent law, when correctly 
implemented, actually incentivizes innovation, then errors in the patent-granting process 
could harm innovation. See id. at 2141. 
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also increase the quality of filed applications, as applicants would 
have greater ex ante incentives to assess and improve application 
quality. These changes in applicant behavior would decrease the 
number of weak applications and resulting weak patents.150 
Of course, even if we fix the pricing of patents, that would 
not help us remove already-existing weak patents. But at least it 
would meaningfully address the problem going forward, at the 
earliest possible stage, before a weak patent application is even 
filed. More importantly, it would move our patent system closer 
to the ideal in which spurious invention is disincentivized and 
true innovation is properly rewarded. 
                                            
 150. While not the focus of this paper, this Article appears to be the first to propose 
importing loser-pays principles into an ex parte proceeding or application setting. Hence, 
the principles discussed here might apply in a number of different areas. As an 
illustration, consider an application process that is familiar to many law students—the 
law review submission process. Currently, authors pay a low, per-journal flat fee if they 
submit their articles electronically (as most do nowadays) through services such as 
ExpressO or Scholastica. Accordingly, there is little incentive for authors to target where 
they send their articles, or to be conservative in the number of journals to which they 
apply. The results of this system are familiar and unfortunate—authors apply to too 
many journals at once, and use offers from lower-ranked journals to obtain offers at 
higher-ranked journals. 
The problem here is that there is no significant additional cost for authors when they 
blanket-apply to multiple journals. Loser pays might fix this submission system. For 
example, each law review could charge authors a significant application fee (e.g., $50). If 
the author does not receive an offer from the journal, or if he rejects an offer from the 
journal, the money is forfeited. If the author receives an offer and accepts it, he receives a 
prize that is based on the number of “losing” submissions in the cycle. This prize will be 
higher for more selective journals that receive more submissions (since the number of 
“losers” will be higher for those journals). 
Such a system would disincentivize individuals with low quality pieces and 
encourage them to spend more time trying to improve the quality of their articles before 
submitting them. Moreover, authors would have an incentive to target certain journals 
that might be a good match for their article rather than applying blindly. Law review 
editors would also benefit because the number of submissions would decrease, and ceteris 
paribus, the time to review each submission would increase. 
Interestingly, using fees in a creative way to improve journal selection is not merely a 
hypothetical exercise posed here. The Journal of Financial Economics, for example, 
refunds fees on the final submission if a paper is accepted, or if the journal took an 
abnormally long time to review the submission. And the Journal of Finance awards 
annual prizes for the top three papers published that year in the journal ($10,000 for the 
top paper, and $5,000 for two distinguished papers). A similar approach might be used to 
improve the law review submission and selection process. 
